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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In 1584, Lanfranco da Oriano, one the first scholars of 
commercial arbitration in the period of the Law Merchant, published 
an essay in Venice in which he noticed that the “subject of arbitration 
is of a great utility but it is always badly explained by legal 
scholars.”1 Five centuries later, many businessmen still agree with 
Lanfranco since their perception of the law of international trade 
seems completely different from that of many legal scholars, 
including their lawyers.  
 In truth, a reconciliation of the two visions is possible since it is 
the most important task of any (good) international arbitrator. This 
task is easier today with reference to the UNIDROIT Principles for 
international commercial contracts. The growth of a global economy 
rooted in the cosmopolitan nature of commerce and the development 
of new means of transportation and communication demand the 
prompt formation of a uniform transnational commercial law.2 
________________________________________________________________ 
 1. Lanfranco da Oriano, Materiam arbitrorum utilem fore et quotidianam a 
nostrisque doctoribus male esplicatam, in TRACTATUS DE ARBITRIS 206 (1584). See 
generally FABRIZIO MARRELLA & A. MOZZATO, ALLE ORIGINI DELL’ARBITRATO 
COMMERCIALE INTERNAZIONALE. L’ARBITRATO A VENEZIA TRA MEDIOEVO ED ETÀ 
MODERNA (2001). 
 2. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (1994), 34 I.L.M. 1067 (1995) 
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Principles]. See Le droit commercial uniforme au XXI siècle, 
Actes du Congrès de la CNUDCI, New York, May 18-22, 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/SER.D/1, 1995; see generally FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA (2001) 
(discussing the ancient Law Merchant and its afterlife); Fabrizio Marrella & Fabian 
Gélinas, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts in ICC 
Arbitration, 10 ICC INT’L COURT OF ARB. BULL. 26, 26-119 (1999) (discussing the 
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Whether one agrees or disagrees with lex mercatoria doctrines, one 
must accept the fact that a significant number of awards have made 
reference to them, whatever that means.3 Legal scholars have tried to 
                                                                                                                      
application of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts in ICC 
arbitration); Fabrizio Marrella, UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts in ICC Arbitration (1999-2001), 12 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 49, 49-115 
(2001) (discussing the latest applications); Fabrizio Marrella, La nuova lex mercatoria, 
in TRATTATO DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO DELL’ECONOMIA DIRETTO 
DA FRANCESCO GALGANO (2003) (discussing results and further applications). 
 3. See Berthold Goldman, Arbitrage international et droit comun des nations, 
1956 REV. ARB. 115, 115 and accompanying notes; Frontières du droit et lex mercatoria, 
[1964] ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIC DU DROIT 177, 177 and accompanying notes (1964); 
Berthold Goldman La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et l’arbitrage international: 
réalité et perspectives, 106 J. DU DROIT INT’L 475, 475-99 (1979); La volonté des parties 
et le rôle de l’arbitrage dans l’arbitrage international, 1981 REV. ARB. 469-81; see 
generally The Applicable Law: General Principles of Law—the Lex Mercatoria, in 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 113 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 
1986); L’arbitre, les conflits de lois et la lex mercatoria, in ACTES DU LER COLLOQUE SUR 
L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 103 (Prujiner Antaki ed., 1986); Nouvelles 
réflexions sur la lex mercatoria, in ETUDES P. LALIVE 241 (1993); PHILIPPE KAHN, LA 
VENTE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL; Philippe Kahn, Lex mercatoria et Euro-
obligations, in FESTSCHRIFT C. SCHMITTOFF 240 (1973); PHILIPPE KAHN, LEX 
MERCATORIA ET PRATIQUE DES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX; Philippe Kahn, L’essor du 
non droit dans les relations commerciales internationales et le contrat sans loi, in 
L’HYPOTHESE DU NON DROIT 231 (1978); Philippe Kahn, Droit international économique, 
droit du développement et Lex mercatoria, concept unique ou pluralisme des ordres 
juridiques, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES, ETUDES 
OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 97 (Litec ed., 1982); Philippe Kahn, Rapport français, 
in LE ROLE DE LA PRATIQUE DANS LA FORMATION DU DROIT 247 (Henry Capitant ed., 
1985); PHILIPPE KAHN, DROIT ET MONNAIE: ETATS ET ESPACE MONETAIRE 
TRANSNATIONAL (1988); Philippe Kahn, Les principes généraux du droit devant les 
arbitres internationaux, 116 J. DU DROIT INT’L 305 (1989); Philippe Kahn, La lex 
mercatoria, point de vue français après quarante ans de controverse, 37 MCGILL L.J. 
413 (1992); Philippe Kahn, L’internationalisation de la vente, in ETUDES PLANTEY 297 
(1995); Philippe Kahn, Les Principes d’UNIDROIT comme droit applicable aux contrats 
internationaux, in CONTRATTI COMMERCIALI INTERNAZIONALI E PRINCIPI UNIDROIT 39 
(Michael Joachim Bonell & F. Bonelli eds. 1997); Philippe Kahn, Vers l’institutionnalisation 
de la lex mercatoria: a propos des principes d’UNIDROIT relatifs aux contrats du commerce 
international, in LIBER AMICORUM COMMISSION DROIT ET VIE DES AFFAIRES 125 (1988); 
Philippe Kahn, Les contrats internationaux de coopération scientifique et technique 
inter-entreprises face aux Principes d’UNIDROIT, RDU/ULR 519-24 (1988); Philippe 
Kahn, A propos de l’ordre public transnational: quelques observations, in MELANGES 
FRITZ STURM 1539-50 (1999); Philippe Kahn, A propos des sources du droit du 
commerce international, in MELANGES FARJAT 185 (1997); Jacques Beguin, Le 
développement de la lex mercatoria menace-t-il l’ordre juridique international, 30 
MCGILL L.J. 478, 478-538 (1985); J. Mousseron, Lex mercatoria: bonne mauvaise idée 
ou mauvaise bonne idée?, in MELANGES L. BOYER 469 (1996); René David, Il diritto del 
commercio internazionale: un nuovo compito per i legislatori nazionali o una nuova lex 
mercatoria?, RIV. DIR. CIV. 578 (1976); Aleksander Goldstajn, The New Law Merchant, 
J. BUS. L. 12-17 (1961); Aleksander Goldstajn, The New Law Merchant Reconsidered, in 
Law and International Trade, in FESTSCHRIFT FUER CLIVE M. SCHMITTHOFF ZUM 70 
GEBURTSTAG 171 (1973); Harold J. Berman & Colin Kaufman, The Law of International 
Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT’L L.J. 221 (1978); Bernado M. 
Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonization of the 
Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT’L L.J. 317 (1984); Ole 
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Lando, The Lex Mercatoria in International Commercial Arbitration, 34 INT’L COMP. 
L.Q. 747 (1985); Ole Lando, Lex mercatoria 1985-1996, in 2 FESTSKRIFT TILL STIG 
STRÖMHOLM 576-84 (Ake Frandberg ed., 1997); F. Bortolotti, La “nuova” Lex 
mercatoria: Costruzione dottrinaria o strumento operativo?, in CONTRATTO E 
IMP./EUROPA 734 (1996); I. Strenger, La notion de lex mercatoria en droit du commerce 
international, 11 R.C.A.D.I. 207, 207-355, tbl. 227 (1991); F. DASSER, INTERNATIONALE 
SCHIEDSGERICHTE UND LEX MERCATORIA (1989); P.F. WEISE, LEX MERCATORIA: MATERIELLES 
RECHT VOR DER INTERNATIONALEN HANDELSSCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT (1990); RICCARDO 
MEYER, BONA FIDES UND LEX MERCATORIA IN DER EUROPAISCHEN RECHTSTRADITION 
(1994); U. STEIN, LEX MERCATORIA: REALITAET UND THEORIE 1-318 (1995); RICARDO 
MONACO, Note sulla qualificazione della lex mercatoria, in STUDI GORLA 1249-66 
(1984); Klaus Peter Berger, The Lex Mercatoria Doctrine and the UNIDROIT Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 943 (1997); 
Emmanuel Gaillard, Trente ans de lex mercatoria; pour une application sélective de la 
méthode des principes généraux du droit, 122 J. DU DROIT INT’L 5 (1995); Hilmar 
Raeschke-Kessler, The UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial Contracts: 
A New Lex Mercatoria?, ICC/DOSSIER 167 (1995); LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL 
PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (C. Donahue, 
Jr. ed., 1988); PHILIPPE DE LY, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW AND LEX MERCATORIA 
260 (1992); Philippe de Ly, Lex mercatoria (New Law Merchant): Globalization and 
International Self-Regulation, DIR. COMMERCIALE INT’L 555, 555-90 (2000); Friedrich 
K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, RDU/ULR 171 (2000); 
Barton S. Selden, Lex mercatoria in European and U.S. Trade Practice: Time to Take a 
Closer Look, in GOLDEN GATE U. SCHOOL OF LAW ANNUAL SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW (1995); MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, LA MODERNA LEX 
MERCATORIA TRA MITO E REALTÀ 315-32 (1996); Michael Joachim Bonell, Voce Lex 
Mercatoria, DIG. SEZ. COMM. 11, 11-17 (1993); Viè spazio per una lex mercatoria?, in 
SIDI, LA RIFORMA DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 200 (1999); Friedrich K. 
Jeunger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law, 60 L.A. L. REV. 1133 
(2000); LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT 
(Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1988) (especially essays by Audit, Smit, and Lowenfeld); 
KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF LEX MERCATORIA (1999); Eric 
Loquin, Où en est la lex mercatoria?, in MÉLANGES PHILIPPE KAHN 23-51 (2000); A. 
Pellet, La lex mercatoria, “tiers ordre juridique”? Remarques ingénues d’un 
internationaliste de droit public, in MÉLANGES PHILIPPE KAHN 54-74 (2000); W. 
LAWRENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE ARBITRATION 639 (2000). For critics of the doctrine, see generally Paul 
Lagarde, Approche critique à la lex mercatoria, in MÉLANGES GOLDMAN 145 (1987); 
ANTONE KASSIS, THÉORIE GÉNÉRALE DES USAGES SU COMMERCE, DROIT COMPARÉ, 
CONTRATS ET ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAUX, LEX MERCATORIA (1984); Gbenga Bamodu, 
Exploring the Interrelationships of Transnational Commercial Law, “The New Lex 
Mercatoria” and International Commercial Arbitration, AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31 
(1998); Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International Contracts: A 
Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 657, 658-
59 (1999); Keith Highet, The Enigma of the Lex Mercatoria, 63 TUL. L. REV. 613 (1989); 
Lord Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, in LIBER 
AMICORUM LORD WILBERFORCE 181 (1987): 
Essentially, the lex mercatoria is a doctrine of laissez-faire. In very many parts of 
the world it is considered that the exercise of free consent by individual parties 
must be subordinated to broader economic and political considerations bearing on 
international trade. Furthermore, the disfavour with which transnational groups 
or corporations are now regarded in some quarters cannot but hinder the general 
acceptance of a doctrine whose legitimacy is seen, rightly or wrongly, as derived 
at least in part from the existence of such bodies . . . the proponents of the lex 
mercatoria claim it to be the law of the international business community: which 
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solve the Babel of law dilemma, which was announced with much 
worry by the French comparatist René David, by creating a 
compilation of principles intended to provide one codified answer to 
the challenge of lex mercatoria. The dawn of the third millennium 
witnesses the spread of one of the twentieth century’s most striking 
legal innovations: the codification of general principles of 
international commercial contract law under a nonbinding format by 
an international organization. New actors of international trade call 
for new rules, and the winds of change are affecting the regulatory 
activity patterns of some international organizations. A striking 
example is UNIDROIT.  
 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law 
(UNIDROIT) was established at the beginning of the 20th century in 
order to promote the international uniformity of state legislations. 
However, UNIDROIT has elaborated an international code in which 
general principles of contract law specifically adapted for non-
national transactions have been compounded.4 Paradoxically, this 
Institute aimed at conventional unification of law5 has carried out the 
work of scientific unification of transnational commercial law, 
something never tried before. 
 Today, every reader of the imposing legal literature on the 
UNIDROIT Principles is confronted by a phenomenon which has 
reunited international, private, and comparative law scholars in 
common reflection, and has torn down the common state-centered 
                                                                                                                      
must mean the law unanimously adopted by all countries engaged upon 
international commerce. . . . Such a claim would have been sustainable two 
centuries ago. But the international business community is now immeasurably 
enlarged. What principles of trade law, apart from those which are so general as 
to be useless, are common to the legal systems of the members of such a 
Community? 
Andrea Giardina, La lex mercatoria et la sécurité du commerce et des investissements 
internationaux, in HOMMAGE À FRANÇOIS RIGAUX 223 (1993); F. De Castro, El arbitraje 
y la nueva “Lex mercatoria”, 4 A.D.C. 619 (1979); J.M. Gondra, La moderna Lex 
mercatoria y la unificacion del derecho del comercio internacional, REV. DE DERECHO 
MERCANTIL 738 (1973); DERECHO DEL COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL 46 (J. Fernandez 
Rozas ed., 1996); Gilberlo I. Boutin, Autour de la reception de la lex mercatoria en droit 
positif panameen: Developpement historique et definition d’un jus mercatorum au 
Panama, RDU/ULR 305, 305-11, nn.2-3 (1998); M. Virgos Soriano, Lex mercatoria, in 
DICCIONARIO JURIDICO 3993-94 (1997); Joachim Mertens, Lex mercatoria, A Self-
applied System Beyond National Law?, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 37 (Gunther 
Teubner ed., 1997); PIERRE MAYER, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 465 n.702 (5th ed. 
1994). 
 4. It is clear that the UNIDROIT Principles are not an international 
convention, nor an international organization resolution. They are basically a 
restatement of international contract law which represents rules common to the world 
market. 
 5. See generally, e.g., R. Monaco, Istituto Internazionale per l’Unificazione del 
diritto privato, in ENC. GIUR. TRECCANI (1988). 
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partitions of legal science, at least in continental Europe.6 A leading 
Italian scholar has warned that we might face a turning point in the 
legal thinking of international trade:  
[T]he effectiveness of this new Digest relies on the ongoing number of 
international arbitral awards that, in resolving disputes by applying lex 
mercatoria, make textual reference to the UNIDROIT principles, 
assuming them to be a credited source.  The essence of this compilation 
resides in the blend of contractual practice with universally accepted 
general principles of law. Here, the political mediation of competing 
interests, peculiar to the law created by States is replaced, just like in 
the ancient times of lex mercatoria, by the cultural mediation of legal 
scholars.7 
 Further evidence of the growing importance of lex mercatoria 
and the UNIDROIT Principles is offered in the European Commission 
green paper “on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations into a Community 
instrument and its modernisation.”8 In Europe, it is now time to 
transform the 1980 Rome Convention into an E.C. regulation, and the 
Commission has pointed out that “traditionally, most academic 
writers have ruled out the possibility of choosing non-state rules, 
particularly because there is not yet a full and consistent body of such 
rules.” However, in 2003 the situation seems different from the one 
prevailing in 1980. The hundreds of scholars throughout the world 
who repeat that lex mercatoria (and the UNIDROIT Principles) does 
not exist, or worse, is not applied to international contracts, risk to be 
outdated. 
 Hence, the European Commission suggests a modification of 
Article 3 of the Rome Convention (on choice of law by the parties) to 
encompass a choice of transnational rules. Such a modification is 
necessary because: 
[I]t is common practice in international trade for the parties to refer not 
to the law of one or other state but direct to the rules of an 
international convention such as the Vienna Convention of 11 April 
1980 on contracts for the international sale of goods, to the customs of 
international trade, to the general principles of law, to the lex 
mercatoria or to recent private codifications such as the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts.9 
The present analysis aims to build up some models of application of 
transnational rules, including the UNIDROIT Principles, on the basis 
of patterns observed in arbitral jurisprudence. This will help to 
________________________________________________________________ 
 6. For an extensive bibliography, see http://www.unilex.info. 
 7. Translated from Francesco Galgano, Diritto ed economia alle soglie del 
nuovo millennio, in 1 CONTRATTO E IMPRESA 205 (2000). 
 8. European Commission, Green Paper, On the Conversion of the Rome 
Convention of 1980 into a Community Instrument and Its Modernisation, 654 (Jan. 14, 
2003) (on file with author). 
 9. Id. at 22. 
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estimate, in a more accurate way, the role of these rules in the 
development of international commercial arbitration law at the dawn 
of the third millennium.10  
 Since their official presentation in May 1994, the UNIDROIT 
Principles on international commercial contracts have received 
various applications, either in the framework of institutional 
arbitration, or in the context of ad hoc arbitration.11 The importance 
of ICC institutional arbitration leads one to focus the present study 
on patterns of international jurisprudence rendered in that specific 
framework. In this respect, a recent study on those awards has shown 
that the UNIDROIT Principles on international commercial contracts 
have been applied in at least 38 awards in the period comprising May 
1994 to December 31, 2000.12  
 The preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles states that these 
rules become applicable: “[w]hen the parties have agreed that their 
contract be governed by them. They may be applied when the parties 
have agreed that their contract be governed by ‘general principles of 
law,’ the ‘lex mercatoria’ or the like.” Moreover, “they may provide a 
solution to an issue raised when it proves impossible to establish the 
relevant rule of the applicable law. They may be used to interpret or 
supplement international uniform law instruments. They may serve 
as a model for national and international legislators.”13 
________________________________________________________________ 
 10. See generally STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THREE 
SALIENT PROBLEMS (1987); John J. BARCELÓ III ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1999); MICHAEL 
REISMAN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES 
ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES (1997); ALAN REDFERN & 
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW & PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (3d 
ed. 1999); FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999); H. Grigera Naon, Choice 
of Law Problems in International Commercial Arbitration, 289 R.C.A.D.I. 9 (2001).  
 11. See Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles and Transnational 
Law, 5 RDU/ULR 1 (2001). 
 12. See Fabrizio Marrella & Fabian Gélinas, The UNIDROIT Principles for 
International Commercial Contracts in ICC Arbitration, 10 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 
26 (1999); Fabrizio Marrella & Fabian Gélinas, Principes UNIDROIT relatifs aux 
contrats du commerce international dans l’arbitrage de la Chambre de Commerce 
International, 10 BULLETIN DE LA COUR INT’L D’ARBITRAGE DE LA CCI 26 (1999) (French 
version). On the latest applications, see FABRIZIO MARRELLA, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES 
OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ICC ARBITRATION (1999-2001) 49-115 
(2002). 
 13. The official comment to the UNIDROIT Principles states:   
The Principles set forth general rules which are basically conceived for 
‘international commercial contracts.’ 
1. “International” contracts  
The international character of a contract may be defined in a great variety of 
way. The solutions adopted in both national and international legislation range 
from a reference to the place of business or habitual residence of the parties in 
different countries to the adoption of more general criteria such as the contract 
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having “significant connections with more than one State,” “involving a choice 
between the laws of different States,” or “affecting the interests of international 
trade.” 
The Principles do not expressly lay down any of these criteria. The assumption, 
however, is that the concept of “international” contracts should be given the 
broadest possible interpretation, so as ultimately to exclude only those 
situations where no international element at all is involved, i.e. where all the 
relevant elements of the contract in question are connected with one country 
only.  
2. “Commercial” contracts  
The restriction to “commercial” contracts is in no way intended to take over the 
distinction traditionally made in some legal systems between “civil” and 
“commercial” parties and/or transactions, i.e. to make the application of the 
Principles dependent on whether the parties have the formal status of 
“merchants” (commerçants, Kaufleute) and/or the transaction is commercial in 
nature. The idea is rather that of excluding from the scope of the Principles so-
called “consumer transactions” which are within the various legal systems 
being increasingly subjected to special rules, mostly of a mandatory character, 
aimed at protecting the consumer, i.e. a party who enters into the contract 
otherwise than in the course of its trade or profession. The criteria adopted at 
both national and international level also vary with respect to the distinction 
between consumer and non-consumer contract. The Principles do not provide 
any express definition, but the assumption is that the concept of “commercial” 
contracts should be understood in the broadest possible sense, so as to include 
not only trade transactions for the supply or exchange of goods or services, but 
also other types of economic transactions, such as investment and/or concession 
agreements, contracts for professional services, etc.  
3. The Principles and domestic contracts between private persons  
Notwithstanding the fact that the Principles are conceived for international 
commercial contracts, there is nothing to prevent private persons from agreeing 
to apply the Principles to a purely domestic contract. Any such agreement 
would however be subject to the mandatory rules of the domestic law governing 
the contract.  
4. The Principles as rules of law governing the contract  
a. Express choice by the parties 
As the Principles represent a system of rules of contract law which are common 
to existing national legal systems or best adapted to the special requirements of 
international commercial transactions, there might be good reasons for the 
parties to choose them expressly as the rules applicable to their contract, in the 
place of one or another particular domestic law. 
Parties who wish to adopt the Principles as the rules applicable to their 
contract would however be well advised to combine the reference to the 
Principles with an arbitration agreement. 
The reason for this is that the freedom of choice of the parties in designating 
the law governing their contract is traditionally limited to national law. 
Therefore, a reference by the parties to the Principles will normally be 
considered to be a mere agreement to incorporate them in the contract, while 
the law governing the contract will still have to be determined on the basis of 
the private international law rules of the forum. As a result, the Principles will 
bind the parties only to the extent that they do not affect the rules of the 
applicable law from which the parties may not derogate. 
2003] INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1145 
                                                                                                                      
The situation may be different if the parties agree to submit disputes arising 
from their contract to arbitration. Arbitrators are not necessarily bound by a 
particular domestic law. This is self-evident if they are authorised by the 
parties to act as amiable compositeurs or ex aequo et bono. But even in the 
absence of such an authorisation there is a growing tendency to permit the 
parties to choose “rules of law” other than national laws on which the 
arbitrators are to base their decision. See in particular Article 28(1) of the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration; see also 1965 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States art. 42(1) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].  
In line with this approach, the parties would be free to choose the Principles as 
the “rules of law” according to which the arbitrators would decide the dispute, 
with the result that the Principles would apply to the exclusion of any 
particular national law, subject only to the application of those rules of 
domestic law which are mandatory irrespective of which law governs the 
contract (see Art. 1.4). In disputes falling under the ICSID Convention, the 
Principles might even be applicable to the exclusion of any domestic rule of law.  
b. The Principles applied as lex mercatoria 
Parties to international commercial contracts who cannot agree on the choice of 
a particular domestic law as the law applicable to their contract sometimes 
provide that it shall be governed by the “general principles of law,” by the 
“usages and customs of international trade”, by the lex mercatoria, etc. 
Hitherto, such reference by the parties to not better identified principles and 
rules of a supranational or transnational character has been criticised, among 
other grounds, because of the extreme vagueness of such concept. In order to 
avoid, or at least considerably to reduce, the uncertainty accompanying the use 
of such vague concepts for the determination of their content, it might be 
advisable to have recourse to a systematic and well-defined set of rules such as 
the Principle.  
5. The Principles as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise 
applicable  
The Principles may however become relevant even where the contract is 
governed by a particular domestic law. This is the case whenever it proves 
extremely difficult if not impossible to establish the relevant rule of that 
particular domestic law with respect to a specific issue and a solution can be 
found in the Principle. The reasons for such a difficulty generally lie in the 
special character of the legal sources and/or the cost of access to them. 
Recourse to the Principles as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise 
applicable is of course to be seen as a last resort; on the other hand it may be 
justified not only in the event of the absolute impossibility of establishing the 
relevant rule of the applicable law, but also whenever the research involved 
would entail disproportionate efforts and/or cost. The current practice of courts 
in such situations is that of applying the lex fori. Recourse to the Principles 
would have the advantage of avoiding the application of a law which will in 
most cases be more familiar to one of the partie.  
6. The Principles as a means of interpreting and supplementing 
existing international instruments  
Any legislation, whether of international or national origin, raises questions 
concerning the precise meaning of its individual provision. Moreover, such 
legislation is by its very nature unable to anticipate all the problems to which it 
will be applied. When applying domestic statutes it is possible to rely on long 
established principles and criteria of interpretation to be found within each 
legal system. The situation is far more uncertain with respect to instruments 
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 The issue of choice of law in international arbitration has long 
been debated in specialized private international law literature by 
international commercial arbitration scholars.14 Today, there is little 
                                                                                                                      
which, although formally incorporated into the various national legal systems, 
have been prepared and agreed upon at international level. 
According to the traditional view recourse should, even in such cases, be had to 
the principles and criteria provided in domestic law, be it the law of the forum 
or that which would, according to the relevant rules of private international 
law, be applicable in the absence of the uniform law. 
At present, both courts and arbitral tribunals tend more and more to abandon 
such a “conflictual” method and seek instead to interpret and supplement 
international instruments by reference to autonomous and internationally 
uniform principle. This approach, which has indeed been expressly sanctioned 
in the most recent conventions (see, e.g., Art. 7 of the 1980 UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG)), is based on the 
assumption that uniform law, even after its incorporation into the various 
national legal systems, only formally becomes an integrated part of the latter, 
whereas from a substantive point of view it does not lose its original character 
of a special body of law autonomously developed at international level and 
intended to be applied in a uniform manner throughout the world. Until now, 
such autonomous principles and criteria for the interpretation and 
supplementing of international instruments have had to be found in each single 
case by the judges and arbitrators themselves on the basis of a comparative 
survey of the solutions adopted in the different national legal system. The 
Principles could considerably facilitate their task in this respect.  
7. The Principles as a model for national and international legislators  
In view of their intrinsic merits the Principles may in addition serve as a model 
to national and international law-makers for the drafting of legislation in the 
field of general contract law or with respect to special types of transaction. At a 
national level, the Principles may be particularly useful to those countries 
which lack a developed body of legal rules relating to contracts and which 
intend to update their law, at least with respect to foreign economic 
relationships, to current international standard. Not too different is the 
situation of those countries with a well-defined legal system, but which after 
the recent dramatic changes in their socio-political structure have an urgent 
need to rewrite their laws, in particular those relating to economic and 
business activities. 
At an international level the Principles could become an important term of 
reference for the drafting of conventions and model law. 
So far the terminology used to express the same concept differs considerably 
from one instrument to another, with the obvious risk of misunderstandings 
and misinterpretation. Such inconsistencies could be avoided if the terminology 
of the Principles were to be adopted as an international uniform glossary.  
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, cmts. 1-7; see generally Marrella & Gélinas, 10 
ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL., supra note 10. 
 14. See generally P. NYGH, CHOICE OF FORUM AND LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1997); M. Pryles, Choice of Law Issues in International 
Arbitration, 63 ARB. 200 (1997); PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS: THE 
LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 380-590 (Albert Jan van den Berg 
ed., 1996); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, TRAITÉ 
DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 783-895 (1996); NAON H. GRIGERA, 
CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (1991); 
Berthold Goldman, Les conflits de lois dans l’arbitrage international de droit privé, II 
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doubt that arbitrators are, to a large extent, free from the constraints 
imposed by conflict-of-law rules of the seat of the arbitration, the lex 
situs arbitri.   
 Conversely, if an international arbitrator opposes the rules of the 
lex situs arbitri, it follows that the arbitrator will face more complex 
                                                                                                                      
R.C.A.D.I., 351, 351-483, tbl. 109 (1963); Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et lex 
mercatoria, supra note 3; Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les contrats et 
l’arbitrage international: réalité et perspectives, 106 J. DU DROIT INT’L 475, 481 (1979); 
Berthold Goldman, La volonté des parties et le rôle de l’arbitrage dans l’arbitrage 
international, 1981 REV. ARB. 469; Berthold Goldman, Une bataille judiciaire autour de 
la lex mercatoria. L’affaire Norsolor, 1983 REV. ARB. 379; Berthold Goldman, V 
Arbitrage en droit international privé, in ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ-DROIT INTERNATIONAL 
(1989); Berthold Goldman, Instance judiciaire et instance arbitrale internationale, in 
ETUDES BELLET 219; S.R. Shackleton, The Applicable Law in International Arbitration 
under the New English Arbitration Act 1996, 13 ARB. INT’L 375 (1997); Frederick 
Alexander Mann, The Proper Law in the Conflict of Laws, 36 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 437 
(1987); Piero Bernardini, Contratti internazionali e diritto applicabile, 393 DIR. COMM. 
INT. (1987); G. BERNINI, L’ARBITRATO DIRITTO INTERNO CONVENZIONI INTERNAZIONALI 
347 (1993); JULIAN D.M. LEW, THE APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 1 (1978); Yves Derains, La jurisprudence des arbitres du commerce 
international en matière de determination du droit applicable au contrat, 4 INT’L BUS. 
L.J. 514, 514-30 (1996); Yves Derains, The ICC Arbitral Process Part VIII: Choice of the 
Law Applicable to the Contract and International Arbitration, 6 ICC INT’L CT. ARB. 
BULL. 10, 10-18 (1995); Yves Derains, Attente légitime des parties et droit applicable au 
fond en matière d’arbitrage commercial international, in TRAVAUX DU COMITE FRANÇAIS 
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 80-92 (1985); Philippe Kahn, A propos des sources du 
droit du commerce international, supra note 3, at 185 (1991); C. Leben, Retour sur la 
notion de contrat d’Etat et sur le droit applicable a celui-ci, in MELANGES OFFERTES A 
HUBERT THIERRY 247-80 (1988); Hans Smit, Proper choice of law and the lex mercatoria 
arbitralis, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW 
MERCHANT 59-75 (1990); Riccardo Monaco, Le droit applicable au fond du litige dans la 
Convention européenne sur l’arbitrage, 9 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 331 (1962); John R. Crook, Applicable Law in International 
Arbitration: the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 278 (1981) 
(for applications in US-Iran Claims Tribunal); John R. Crook, The Applicable Law in an 
International Commercial Arbitration: Is It Still a Conflict of Laws Problem?, 16 INT’L 
LAW. 613, 613-45 (1982); Campbell MacLachlan, Splitting the Proper Law in Private 
International Law, 61 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 311 (1990); L. Fumagealli, La legge 
applicabile al merito della controversia nell’ arbitrato commerciale internazionale, RIV. 
DIR. INT. PRIV. E. PROC. 465 (1985); Mark Garavaglia, In Search of the Proper Law in 
Transnational Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 29 (1991); T.C. 
Hartley, Beyond the Proper Law: Mandatory Rules under Draft Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 4 EUR. L. REV. 236 (1979); K. Lionnet, Should 
the Procedural Law Applicable to International Arbitration be Denationalised or 
Unified? The Answer of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 8 J. INT’L ARB. 5 (1991); A. 
Mebroukine, Le droit applicable aux contrats internationaux des entreprises publiques 
economiques algeriennes: Tendances actuelles, 68 REV. DE DROIT INT’L ET DE DROIT 
COMPARE 51 (1991); N. Parisi, Spunti in tema di clausola arbitrale nei contratti 
internazionali alla luce della recente prassi italiana, DIR. COMMERCIALE INT’L 781 
(1997); E. Spiro, Re-examination of the Proper Law, in LAW AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE; 
D.R. Thomas, Commercial Arbitration: Arbitration Agreements as a Signpost of the 
Proper Law, LLOYD’S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 141 (1984); Veijo Heiskanen, Theory and 
Meaning of the Law Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 4 FIN. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 98, 98-129 (1993). 
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issues than would be faced by domestic courts. In fact, sometimes the 
obligation or the chance to apply the forum law by a domestic court is 
a good excuse to avoid further research for the most appropriate rules 
of law to resolve the disputes. International arbitrators, on the other 
hand, do not have the chance to hide behind the simple application of 
the forum law. They do not render the award in the name or on 
behalf of the state in which the situs arbitri is located.  Rather, their 
decision is the result of a jurisdictional activity which finds its roots 
in the parties’ will. Thus, the international arbitrator is called to 
realize a particular kind of multistate (or better transnational) justice 
where conflict rules and the consequent determination of the proper 
law of the contract should lead to the application of rules and general 
principles of substantive law enjoying wide international consensus.15   
 The implication of the UNIDROIT Principles for contemporary 
private international law applied to arbitration can be summarized 
by referring to four issues: characterization, discussed in Section II; 
preliminary questions, discussed in Section III; the concept of foreign 
law, discussed in Section IV; and the relationship between foreign law 
and state control mechanisms, discussed in Section V. All these issues 
will be addressed with reference to institutional arbitration, leaving 
aside specific problems of ad hoc arbitration.  
II.  ON CHARACTERIZATION  
 Whenever determining the applicable law, domestic courts and 
even international arbitration tribunals may face problems of 
characterization (or classification).16 Despite different perceptions of 
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 15. See generally Rudolf B. Schlesinger & Herbert J. Gündisch, I principi 
generali del diritto come norme oggettive nei procedimenti arbitrali. Un contributo alla 
teoria della denazionalizzazione dei contratti, RIV. DIR. CIV. 311 (1997); Arthur T. von 
Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 29 
(1977); Luther L. McDougal III, “Private” International Law: Ius Gentium v. Choice of 
Law or Approaches, 38 AM. J. INT’L L. 521 (1990); FREIDRICH K. JUENGHER, CHOICE OF 
LAW AND MULTI-STATE JUSTICE (1993); René David, Arbitrage et droit comparé, 11 
REV. INT’L DE DROIT COMPARE 11 (1950); Berthold Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans 
les contrats et les arbitrages internationaux, 106 J. DU DROIT INT’L 475, 481 (1979); 
Emmanuel Gaillard, Trente ans de Lex Mercatoria. Pour une application sélective des 
principes généraux du droit, 122 J. DU DROIT INT’L 5, 27 (1995). For contributions of 
traditional conflict of laws scholars, see RONALD HARRY GRAVESON, CONFLICT OF LAW, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 7-8 (7th ed. 1974); Jean George Sauveplanne, New 
Trends in the Doctrine of Private International Law and their Impact on Court Practice, 
II R.C.A.D.I. 78, 78-82, tbl. 175 (1982); Bernard Audit, Le caractère fonctionnel de la 
règle de conflit, III R.C.A.D.I. 255, 256-58, tbl. 186. 
 16. Kent Lipstein, International Arbitration Between Individuals and 
Governments and the Conflicts of Law, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 177, 182-89 (Bin Cheng & E. D. Brown eds., 1988); see also P. A. 
Freund, Characterization with Respect to Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, in 
LECTURES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 158-64 (Hessel 
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this problem developed in U.S. and European doctrines,17 there are 
few doubts that it concerns a process of labeling legal issues by 
deciding if they fall into the category of “contracts” or “torts,” and if 
they pertain to matters of “substance” or “procedure.”18 Arbitral case 
law has so far not offered sharp solutions to this classical problem 
and pragmatism of arbitrators has been used to escape from these 
complex issues. 
 Issues of characterization are, to private international law 
scholars, of crucial importance. Since connecting factors are different 
for each of the hereinabove mentioned categories, the applicable law 
will change, modifying the outcome of the dispute. Different conflict-
of-law approaches in the world may invite a plaintiff to shop for the 
forum that characterizes the issue in a manner leading to the 
application of the law most favorable to them. 
 The arbitrator faces rare but peculiar characterization issues 
both in positive choice-of-law cases and in absence of an express 
choice-of-law provision by the parties, including situations in which 
arbitral regulations allow the arbitrator to determine the proper law 
of the contract by following “conflict of laws rules as [that arbitrator] 
deems appropriate.”19 Classical methods for resolving 
characterization issues have been developed contemplating only 
domestic courts and not arbitration tribunals. Domestic courts use 
any of three criteria for characterization: 
! lege fori  
! lege causae 
! resort to general principles of law 
 The first technique, lege fori, is widely accepted in continental 
Europe as it has been approved by scholars and applied by courts.20 It 
clashes, however, with the contemporary de-nationalization 
movement of arbitral procedure. L’arbitre n’a pas de for, arbitrators 
                                                                                                                      
E. Yntema ed. 1949); see generally A.H. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERISATION IN THE 
CONFLICT OF LAWS  (1940). 
 17. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 119 (2000). 
 18. A.E. ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 268-73 (1990); Lawrence Craig, 
William W. Park & Jan Paulsson, Choice of Substantive Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION  283–92 (2d ed. 1990). 
 19. See Rules for the International Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration, 
1988, art. 13.3; Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 42, 4 I.L.M. 532; U.N. Conventions 
on International Trade Laws (UNCITRAL) Rules of Arbitration, 1977, art. 33, 
reprinted in 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 161 (1977); Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration, 1985, art. 28(2); European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, May 16, 1961, art. VII, 484 U.N.T.S. 364. See generally B.P. v. Libya, 53 
I.L.R. 326 (1979).  In addition, if no valid and complete choice is found, the arbitrator 
must resort to other conflict rules, requiring characterization of the matters in dispute 
and determination of the proper law. 
 20. See HENRI BATIFFOL, 1 DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 240 (1974). 
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do not have a forum state: they do not pronounce the words of law on 
behalf of the state of the seat of the arbitration, but they render an 
award because parties have requested them to do so. Further, this 
technique may be of limited use whenever one has to characterize 
certain international business transactions which are unknown under 
domestic law (in Italy, courts have faced this problems on matters of 
trusts and Anstalten, one-man corporations).21 Under an arbitral 
perspective, there are further peculiar problems which show the 
inadequacy of characterization lege fori. 
 Two examples may help to illustrate the problem. 
 If an Italian arbitrator sitting in London has to decide an 
international dispute between Swiss and Argentinean parties, with 
Italian law as lex contractus why should the arbitrator characterize 
issues according to English Law (lex situs arbitri)? A second example: 
three arbitrators of different nationalities (Italian, Swiss and Arab) 
sitting in Zurich, Switzerland have to decide a dispute between a U.S. 
corporation and the Iranian Government. There is no choice of law, 
and arbitrators finally decide to apply the UNIDROIT Principles as 
lex contractus.22 Why should they characterize issues according to 
Swiss Law? 
 Since characterization lege fori may not be the best tool for 
international arbitrators, another common technique is 
characterization lege causae. The latter seems more adapted to 
arbitration, but it clashes with academic writings. The strongest 
objection is a logical one. Characterization is used to interpret choice-
of-law rules, and characterization is necessary to determine the lex 
causae. Since the end result of characterization is the lex causae, it is 
nonsense to adopt the lex causae in order to determine itself. 
 With this problem, we face another turning point between 
conflict-of-law analysis before domestic courts and international 
arbitration tribunals. International arbitration scholars are naturally 
oriented towards the theory according to which an issue should be 
adjudicated by applying the specific law which the parties have 
chosen, or which they can expect to be applied. By consulting the lex 
causae, characterization issues seem to be consistent with parties’ 
expectations.23 But, as explained below, the lex causae may be a state 
legal system or the anational legal system, namely, lex mercatoria or 
________________________________________________________________ 
 21. Now the reform of corporate law is oriented towards recognizing the full 
validity of corporations with only one stockholder. Before the reform, since a 
corporation is a contract, it seemed simply paradoxical to contract with oneself; on the 
other hand the creation of a legal entity from one physical person was perceived as a 
means to escape civil and tax liabilities.  
 22. See ICC Award No. 7375, 11 ICC INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 37 (2001). 
 23. The paradox underlying this method consists in observing that the 
interpretation of the conflict of laws rule leading to the lex causae requires prior 
characterization.  
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the UNIDROIT Principles. In the latter case, the UNIDROIT 
Principles will serve for characterization purposes. Therefore, the 
second technique, though apparently irrational, seems to be more 
suited for transnational arbitration. This said, a third technique 
might perhaps be the best solution to this puzzle. 
 Recourse to general principles of private law for characterization 
purposes is ancient only in academic writings and found its strongest 
advocate in Ernst Rabel, a German scholar who also taught at the 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. More than thirty years ago, Rabel 
pleaded for a characterization technique based on general principles 
of law, but his voice remained unheard. The period in which he stated 
his theory was dominated by what the Belgian François Rigaux has 
called the “derive positiviste,”24 a movement of thinking that has 
dominated domestic and international law under the intellectual 
weight of scholars like Triepel in Germany, Anzilotti in Italy and, to a 
certain extent, the Austrian Kelsen.  
 Currently, critiques of the vagueness of general principles of law 
or, worse, attempts to give political meaning to them in North-South 
new international economic order claims have been partially 
overcome by the UNIDROIT Principles. Hence, the UNIDROIT 
Principles currently represent a system of rules ready to be used by 
arbitrators for characterization even if the applicable law to 
substance to the dispute is a national legal system. UNIDROIT 
principles are also available whenever the applicable law 
encompasses international conventions, be they of uniform private 
international law (i.e. 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations or the Inter-American Convention on the law 
applicable to international contracts)25 or of uniform substantive law 
(i.e. CISG, international factoring, international financial leasinge 
etc.).26  
 In conclusion, the UNIDROIT Principles of international 
commercial contracts seem to offer a viable solution for some 
characterization issues in international commercial arbitration by 
avoiding recourse to lex fori or lex causae and increasing, ipso facto, 
predictability and certainty of legal solutions for transnational 
economic disputes. As a matter of fact, the Principles define the scope 
of contractual matters vis-à-vis tort issues. They also provide the key 
to distinguish matters of substance from matters of procedure. The 
question of characterizing the statute of limitations as a matter of 
substance or procedure, a real nightmare even for the brightest 
international arbitrators, has been resolved by the forthcoming 
________________________________________________________________ 
 24. See generally F. RIGAUX, MÉLANGES PHILIPPE KAHN (2000). 
 25. Friedrich Juenger, The Inter-American Convention on the Law applicable to 
International Contracts: Some Highlights and Comparisons, 42 A. J. COMP. L. 381, 381-
93 (1994). 
 26. See Italian Private International Law No. 218, art. 2.2 (1995). 
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UNIDROIT Principles, Part II. The second part of the Principles, to 
be presented officially in 2004, includes the statute of limitations 
among substantial issues meaning clearly that, under transnational 
law, the statute of limitations is part of the rules of law applicable to 
the merits.27  
III.  ON PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
 Another field of possible application of the UNIDROIT Principles 
is that of preliminary questions in international commercial 
arbitration. As on matters of characterization, classical private 
international law can be precious for arbitration scholars. An 
example drawn from a very recent case will help in identifying the 
issues at stake.28 A European bank had financed a series of export 
sales contracts by Brazilian producers. In order to cover risk of 
frustration of the export sales contracts, the same bank entered into 
insurance contracts subject to French law, with a syndicate of 
insurance companies. The insurance contract contained an 
arbitration clause referring to ICC arbitration. 
 The Brazilian sellers failed to deliver the goods to the buyers 
because of supervening adverse political events in Brazil. 
Accordingly, the bank asked the insurers to pay the prize, but the 
latter objected that the contract did not cover Governmental 
measures in question. The bank started the arbitration procedure. 
During litigation, the defendants pleaded that underlying export 
sales contracts were not valid due to the absence of any 
determination of the price. The arbitral tribunal, sitting in Paris, had 
to face a true preliminary question since the determination of the 
validity of the sales contract, a different contract from the one at 
stake, became a crucial matter to resolve disputes in the latter. 
 The export sales contracts were silent as to the applicable law. 
The arbitral tribunal relied, at first, on Brazilian law according to 
which a sales contract was valid if the price was determinable, as it 
was in the case at hand where the sugar had a market price. In order 
to corroborate their decision, the arbitrators stated that sales 
contracts without an express determination of the price may be valid 
according to generally accepted principles in international trade as 
shown by the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Article 55) and by the 
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (Article 
________________________________________________________________ 
 27. Thus, it is neither part of the lex fori, nor of the lex situs arbitri, nor of the 
lex loci executionis. 
 28. See ICC Award No. 7819, 12 INT’L CT. OF ARB. BULL. 56 (2001), available at 
http://www.unilex.info. 
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5.7).29 Here, the reference to the UNIDROIT Principles is welcomed 
since they resolve a point which is unclear in CISG (which was not 
applicable to the case), given the apparent contradiction between 
Article 14 on formation of contracts (stating that offers should have a 
fixed price or a price-fixing provision) and Article 55 on contracts 
without any price provision. 
 In private international law, four techniques may be used to 
solve preliminary questions. First, under the so-called disjunctive 
method one may submit the preliminary question to the lex fori 
regardless of what the lex contractus says. Again, this solution is 
designed for a domestic court, but the arbitrator does not have a lex 
fori, hence this technique is unhelpful.30 A second option is to consult 
conflict-of-law rules of the lex causae in order to resolve the 
preliminary question. This method seems more adapted for 
arbitration since it avoids conflict-of-law rules of the lex situs arbitri 
and gives more weight to those pertaining to the law chosen by the 
parties or designated by arbitrators taking into account parties’ 
expectations.31 A third possibility is the conjunctive method. By this 
technique, one may consider the preliminary question as absorbed 
into the main issue in dispute. Hence, the applicable law both to the 
preliminary and the principal question in dispute is the same: lex 
causae. For the international arbitrator, the conjunctive method 
remains a valuable one since it is easier to use and respectful of 
parties’ choices. 
 Third-millennium arbitrators will probably opt for this method, 
but they will go beyond classical private international law, since lex 
causae in arbitration can be national or anational. In the latter case, 
if lex contractus are the UNIDROIT Principles or lex mercatoria, the 
preliminary question shall be resolved using the same anational 
rules. It is then possible to appreciate the potential of a new method 
of resolution of preliminary questions. Classical private international 
law has pointed out that it is possible to have recourse to general 
principles of law to resolve preliminary questions. Today, arbitrators 
have at their disposal the UNIDROIT Principles, a codification of 
________________________________________________________________ 
 29. U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, art. 55, 
concluded at Vienna, Apr. 1, 1980, U.N. Doc.A/Conf. 97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 
I.L.M. 671 (1980) [hereinafter Vienna Sales Convention]; UNIDROIT Principles, supra 
note 2, art. 5.7. 
 30. Accordingly, had the arbitrators in ICC Award No. 7819 used the 
disjunctive method they would have solved the preliminary question of the validity of 
the sale contract according to French Law, the lex situs arbitri. Hence, the contract 
would have been considered invalid, since French law does not seem to admit a 
contract of sale without indication of the price. 
 31. Following the example, arbitrators should have considered Article 13 of the 
1988 ICC regulation. Since French law is the lex contractus, French conflict of laws 
rules would have led to the application to the preliminary question of the law of the 
seller, namely Brazilian law. 
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such principles specially adapted for transnational contracts. 
Arbitrators may use UNIDROIT Principles as a tool for resolving 
preliminary questions, as an alternative means to localization 
techniques.32 
IV.  ON CHOICE OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE MERITS OF THE DISPUTE 
A.  Models of Choice 
 Often, in institutional arbitration, arbitral regulations will 
indicate to the arbitrator the path to follow in order to determine the 
law applicable to the substance of the dispute. This consideration 
applies in particular to ICC arbitration where Article 17 of the 1998 
regulations, states the following:  
Applicable Rules of Law  
 1. The parties shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be 
applied by the Arbitral Tribunal to the merits of the dispute. In the 
absence of any such agreement, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the 
rules of law that it determines to be appropriate.  
 2. In all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the 
provisions of the contract and the relevant trade usages.  
 3. The Arbitral Tribunal shall assume the powers of an amiable 
compositeur or decide ex aequo et bono only if the parties have agreed to 
give it such powers33  
 This formula allows either the parties or the arbitrators to 
choose, inter alia, the UNIDROIT Principles as a lex contractus 
without passing through any domestic conflict-of-law rules.34  Similar 
formulas may be found in other leading arbitration rules such as 
Article 28, Paragraph 1 of the 1997 AAA International Arbitration 
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 32. In Award No. 7819, arbitrators have made reference to the UNIDROIT 
Principles among other rules (CISG and Brazilian Law). By using the fourth method it 
would have sufficed to make reference to Article 5.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles, 
reaching the same result as did the arbitrators in the actual case. 
 33. ICC Publication 808, available at http://www.iccarbitration.org (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2003). 
 34. See generally W. LAURENCE CRAIG, WILLIAM W. PARK & JAN PAULSSON, 
ANNOTATED GUIDE TO THE 1998 ICC ARBITRATION RULES 111-12 (1998); YVES DERAINS 
& ERIC SCHWARTZ, A GUIDE TO THE NEW ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 217 (1998); Yves 
Derains, The ICC Arbitral Process, Part VIII: Choice of the Law Applicable to the 
Contract and International Arbitration, 6 BULLETIN DE LA COUR INT’L D’ARBITRAGE DE 
LA CCI 10 (1995); PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, 
TRAITÉ DE L’ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 814 (1996); Marc Blessing, 
Keynotes on Arbitral Decisionmaking, BULLETIN DE LA COUR INTERNATIONAL 
D’ARBITRAGE DE LA CCI 44 (1997); Marc Blessing, Choice of Substantive Law in 
Arbitration, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 39, 39-65 (1997); Marc Blessing, Regulations in 
Arbitration Rules on Choice of Law, in THE LAW APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 391 (1996); HANS SMIT & VRATISLAV PECHOTA, A CHART COMPARING 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE ICC (1998). 
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Rules,35 Article 22.3 of the 1998 LCIA Arbitration Rules,36 or Article 
59 of the 1994 World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration 
Regulations.37 
 Since the most striking event in third millennium international 
commercial arbitrations is the growing application of anational rules, 
this section will focus on use of the UNIDROIT Principles of 
international commercial contracts. The role of transnational rules in 
international commercial arbitration may be fully enjoyed with 
reference to models of choice of law. In order to highlight the model of 
reasoning for choice of substantive law (almost spontaneously) used 
by international arbitrators, it is important to draw a distinction 
between cases in which parties made an express positive reference to 
lex contractus and those in which no such choice was made. In the 
latter case, the choice was made by the arbitrators, pursuant to 
Article 17 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration of 1998 or Article 13 of the 
former (1988) version of the Rules. 
 Thus beyond the “innocent” formula contained in Article 17 of 
ICC regulations lie the following situations: 
! Express choices (positive or negative) 
________________________________________________________________ 
 35. AAA International Arbitriation Rules (1994), available at http://www.law. 
berkeley.edu/faculty/ddcaron/Documents/RPID%20Documents/rp04049.html (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2003).  According to Article 28, paragraph 1:  
The tribunal shall apply the substantive law(s) or rules of law designated by 
the parties as applicable to the dispute. Failing such a designation by the 
parties, the tribunal shall apply such law(s) or rules of laws as it determines to 
be appropriate. 
 36. LCIA Arbitration Rules, (1998) available at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/ 
lcia.arbitration.rules.1998 (last visited Oct. 22, 2003). According to Article 22, 
paragraph 3:  
The arbitral tribunal shall decide the parties’dispute in accordance with the 
law(s) or rules of law chosen by the parties as applicable to the merits of their 
dispute. If and to the extent that the Arbitral Tribunal determines that the 
parties have made no such choice, the Arbitral Tribunal shall apply the law(s) 
or rules of law which it considers appropriate. 
 37. WIPO Arbitration Rules, WIPO Pub. No. 446(E) (1994). According to 
Article 59, Section a: 
The tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with the law or rules of law 
chosen by the parties. Any designation of the law of a given State shall be 
construed, unless otherwise express, as directly referring to the substantive 
law of that State and not to its conflict of laws rules. Failing a choice by the 
parties, the Tribunal shall apply the law or rules of law that it determines to be 
appropriate. In all cases the Tribunal shall decide having due regard to the 
terms of any relevant contract and taking into account applicable trade usages. 
On the application of transnational rules in international commercial arbitration, see 
the Resolution adopted by International Law Association in Cairo on April 26, 1992. 
TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Perio 
Bernardini ed., 1993). 
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! Implied choices (positive or negative) 
! Absence of any choice of law 
 It is well established in arbitration literature that parties may 
choose the law (or rules of law in most modern, widely used 
arbitration regulations) applicable to their contract. Increasingly, the 
realm of party autonomy is expanding such that it can encompass 
situations in which the object of choice is a national legal system or 
an anational legal system like lex mercatoria and UNIDROIT 
Principles. All these choices of lex contractus may be labeled as 
positive choices since parties declare in their contract, or during 
proceedings, what law or rules of law they want arbitrators to apply 
in order to resolve the dispute. 
 From the standpoint of the private international lawyer, the 
UNIDROIT Principles represent a new kind of foreign law. By this 
term, conflict of law scholars refer to a law which is foreign vis-à-vis 
forum law and that may be applied by a court once conflict of law 
rules have been activated. For the same reason, in some 
jurisdictions—but not in Italy after Article 14 of the new PIL—foreign 
law must be proved by the party claiming its application, since iura 
novit curia is limited to domestic law. Domestic courts may be 
reluctant to apply a law they do not know and here we touch upon 
another turning point between state courts and international 
arbitrators methods.  
 For international arbitrators there is no foreign law since they do 
not have a forum law. For them everything is transnational. The 
UNIDROIT Principles (with lex mercatoria) may now be considered 
as a sort of default law.38 While domestic courts shall have a natural 
inclination to resort to national law, the arbitrator can apply the 
UNIDROIT Principles and thus increase the predictability of legal 
solutions. The Principles are increasingly known by transnational 
economic operators (and their lawyers) and they may be reasonably 
known just by consulting the UNIDROIT website for free. 
 Such positive choices might not need to be expressed in a 
contract because they could be considered as implied terms in it. This 
would follow a pattern which has been identified by Article 3, 
Paragraph 1 of 1980 Rome Convention on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations.39 
________________________________________________________________ 
 38. This point seems to be admitted by Professor Pierre Mayer. See Pierre 
Mayer, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in ICC Arbitration Practice, in ICC-
UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERICAL CONTRACTS 117 
(2001). 
 39. Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, 1980 
O.J. (L 266) 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1497 (1980). Article 3 states: 
A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice must 
be express or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the 
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 Beyond the horizon of positive (express or implied) choices of law, 
we enter the land of negative choices. Negative choices happen when 
parties decide that they simply do not want the application of one or 
more laws to the merits of their dispute. This seems to occur in state 
contracts where none of the parties accept the application of the other 
contractor’s law. Thus, as a mirror to positive choices, arbitrators 
may face negative express or implied choices of law. In these 
situations, arbitrators shall have to determine the applicable law to 
substance by respecting fully the negative will of parties of avoiding 
the application of certain legal systems, be they national or anational. 
 The final chapter is the absence of choice of law applicable to 
substance. In this situation, most modern arbitration rules, following 
the model of article 17, mentioned above, allow the arbitrators to 
apply the rules of law they deem to be the most appropriate to the 
issue. Does that mean to apply the lex situs arbitri to the substance of 
the dispute? The answer, of course, is no. The arbitrators today have 
at their disposal a good stock of legal instruments. They can have 
recourse to classical conflict of laws analysis, to general principles of 
private international law or—and that is the new entry for third 
millennium arbitrations—to the UNIDROIT Principles. 
 Our research in ICC arbitration awards has suggested that this 
seems to be more characteristic of very large economic arbitrations40 
than of smaller ones, which consistently prefer a traditional approach 
based on conflict of (national) laws. Moreover, the application of 
UNIDROIT Principles in cases where a positive choice of law is 
absent seems to be more in line with parties’ legitimate 
expectations.41 Provided that arbitrators ascertain, on a case by case 
basis, that UNIDROIT Principles are the most appropriate rules to 
resolve transnational disputes, there is no doubt that the latter will 
offer a new chapter of arbitration law for third-millennium scholars 
and practitioners. 
 In conclusion, the UNIDROIT Principles may be applied by 
arbitrators:  
! As a positive (express or implied) choice of law from the parties;  
! As a result of a negative choice of law analysis;  
! As a neutral law or default law in case of absence of a choice of law 
by the parties 
                                                                                                                      
contract or the circumstances of the case. By their choice the parties can select 
the law applicable to the whole or a part only of the contract. 
Id. art. 3. 
 40. See ICC Award No. 9797 (where the amount in dispute was more than ten 
billion dollars). 
 41. See Yves Derains, The Role of the UNIDROIT Principles in International 
Commercial Arbitration: A European Perspective, in ICC-UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT 
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 14 (2002). 
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B.  The UNIDROIT Principles in Action 
 Once the role of the UNIDROIT Principles has been appreciated 
under a theoretical approach, their actual application in 
transnational economic arbitration can be discussed. Since their 
official presentation in May 1994, the UNIDROIT Principles have 
resulted in various applications, even in the context of the well-
known “old” formula contained in Article 13 of ICC regulations 
referring to “appropriate conflict of law rules.”42 ICC arbitral practice 
has shown that the UNIDROIT Principles have been applied 
essentially in three contexts: as a lex contractus, as a means of 
interpretation and supplementation of international uniform law 
instruments, and, finally, as a means of interpretation or 
supplementation of a domestic lex contractus. A final solution is to 
exclude, in some cases, the application of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
1.  UNIDROIT Principles as a Lex Contractus 
 The UNIDROIT Principles have been applied as a lex contractus 
in at least 12 ICC cases out of a total of 38 awards making reference 
to the Principles (collected between May 1994 and December 31, 
2000) meaning approximately 32 percent of ICC awards on 
UNIDROIT Principles.43 The applications of the Principles have been 
grounded on the rule contained in Article 13 then in force and, 
subsequently, in Article 17 of the 1998 ICC regulations. In those 
awards, the Principles have been applied mostly in cases 
characterized by the absence of a choice of law by the parties. One 
could infer that they have been mainly taken into consideration by 
arbitrators as a useful tool for dispute resolution. It is worth noting 
the Principles have not just been applied by members of the 
UNIDROIT working group. On the contrary, when that situation has 
occurred, arbitrators excluded the application of the Principles 
despite the formal request of one of the parties. 
 In some awards, arbitral tribunals have also found that the 
absence of a positive choice of the applicable law in the contract must 
be interpreted by taking into consideration the negative implicit will 
of each of the parties to avoid the application of the other parties’ 
domestic law. This may lead to connecting the contract to a third 
legal system be it a state legal system or the anational one. In the 
first instance, it is necessary to find, inside the legal relationship at 
issue, sufficient contacts to a particular state. The second instance 
comes about when it is not easy to find evidence of a significant 
________________________________________________________________ 
 42. See Marrella & Gélinas, supra note 2, at 26-119. 
 43. Other examples of this approach may be found in ICC Awards Nos. 7110, 
7375, 8261, 8331, 8874, 8501, 8502, 8503. See id.  
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connection to a third state domestic legal system. In this case, the 
hypothesis of lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT Principles in 
particular, becomes reality. Accordingly, the UNIDROIT Principles 
have been elected via this reasoning by recognizing them as an 
organic and reconstituted set of principles and rules common to major 
world legal systems, in tune with the particular needs of 
international commerce.  Two examples serve to clarify this issue. 
2.  Positive Choice of Law by the Parties: ICC Award Number 7110 
 The first and most important example of such an approach has 
been offered by ICC Award Number 7110.  In that case, a state party 
and a British private contractor entered into a number of contracts 
covering the sale, supply, modification, maintenance, and operation of 
equipment including support services. Most of the contracts did not 
contain any choice-of-law clause and some of them referred to 
“principles of natural justice.” The arbitrators, in a partial award, 
started their reasoning by analyzing elements leading to implicit 
choice-of-law stipulations. Six out of nine contracts contained the 
expressions “natural justice,” “laws of natural justice,” and “rules of 
natural justice,” in association with the resolution of disputes through 
arbitration.  According to the Tribunal:  
 It is clear then that the presence of the expressions ‘natural justice,’ 
‘laws of natural justice,’ and ‘rules of natural justice,’ which were 
undoubtedly the subject of careful consideration and negotiation, may 
not be ignored for assessing if and to which extent the parties have 
indicated the laws or principles governing the Contracts.  However, to 
elucidate their meaning it would be inappropriate to have recourse, in 
bootstrap fashion, exclusively to the legal notions of one of the national 
juristic systems, the application of which is at stake. The fact that the 
Contracts are drafted in English is not decisive, since the English 
language has become an international tool for expressing the terms and 
conditions of sophisticated transactions, even between parties none of 
which is a national of an English speaking country or entering into 
transactions wholly unconnected with any such country. Resorting to 
English when it comes to exteriorizing in black and white the substance 
of a deal does not necessarily imply espousing the technical meaning 
that a specific common law jurisdiction would ascribe to the terms 
utilized.44 
 Yet arbitrators were faced with the issue of characterizing 
“natural justice” since the determination of the procedural or 
substantive nature of such an expression would have had an impact 
on the choice-of-laws process.  The arbitrators believed that a general 
principle of interpretation “widely accepted by national legal systems 
and by the practice of international tribunals” suggests that in case of 
________________________________________________________________ 
 44. See Marrella & Gélinas, supra note 2, at 43-44 (discussing ICC Award No. 
7110).  
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doubt or ambiguity, contractual clauses should be interpreted against 
the drafting party.  However, the tribunal added what follows:  
On the other hand, the meaning to be ascribed to expressions contained 
in international transactions ab initio submitted to international 
commercial arbitration should be consistent with the nature and 
expected role of the dispute-resolution method chosen by the parties 
and the concomitant impact of such choice not only on procedural 
aspects but also on the law governing the merits. 
 Finally, it is also a generally accepted practice by international 
arbitral tribunals, predicated upon elementary notions of coherence and 
rationality, to assume that the same words or expressions shall have 
the same meaning throughout the documents containing them . . . .45 
 The special character of arbitral justice is revealed with the 
following words:  
In international commercial arbitration, though it is imaginable that the 
term ‘justice’ may be utilized only in the sense of procedural justice, i.e. due 
process and fair trial, it is commonly understood as referring to arbitral 
justice in a more comprehensive sense, including not only arbitral 
procedural fairness but also the type of solution regarding the merits—not 
necessarily the same that would be obtained from national courts—that 
should be expected by the parties by the very fact of having chosen 
international commercial arbitration for resolving their contractual 
disputes.  Thus, it is not infrequently stated that often, the parties resort to 
arbitration in order to have access to a ‘justice’ other than that which would 
be obtained by applying a ‘national law,’ particularly when, on account of 
the discrete circumstances of the case, a national law would not be adapted 
to the solution of the dispute at stake. . . . An obvious confirmation that 
notions of justice in international commercial arbitration are not merely 
procedural but are also substantive is that the majority of national statutes 
dealing with international arbitration, international conventions regarding  
arbitration not just concerned with the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral agreements and awards, and arbitration rules contain procedural 
provisions and choice-of-law provisions, i.e. provisions pointing to choice-of-
law solutions only become relevant because the dispute has been submitted 
to international commercial arbitration and which may well differ from 
those that would have been otherwise obtained had the decision of the case 
been left to municipal courts and their private international law systems.46 
 Developing the concept of substantive justice, arbitrators 
reached the conclusion that the specific case at issue was denoted by 
the exclusion of the choice-of-law criteria normally applicable by 
domestic courts. Their conclusion was to resort to general principles 
of law “which may be only defined in the negative as such rules and 
principles not exclusively belonging to a single national legal system.” 
 After a thorough reasoning “the Tribunal conclude[d] that the 
reasonable intention of the parties regarding the substantive law 
applicable to the Contracts was to have all of them governed by 
general legal rules and principles in matter of international 
________________________________________________________________ 
 45. Id. at 44. 
 46. Id. at 45. 
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contractual obligations such as those arising out of the contracts, 
which, though not necessarily enshrined in any specific anational 
legal system, are specially adapted to the needs of international 
transactions like the Contracts and enjoy wide international 
consensus.”47 Combining the above considerations “without prejudice 
to taking into account the provisions of the Contracts and relevant 
trade usages, this Tribunal finds that the Contracts are governed by, 
and should be interpreted in accordance [with], the UNIDROIT 
Principles with respect to all matters falling within the scope of such 
Principles, and for all other matters, by such other general legal rules 
and principles applicable to international contractual obligations 
enjoying wide international consensus.”48 
 The arbitrators felt that they had to offer further justifications 
for their choice and accordingly they listed the following reasons:  
1) the UNIDROIT Principles are a restatement of international legal 
principles applicable to international commercial contracts made by a 
distinguished group of international experts coming from all prevailing 
systems of the world, without the intervention of states or 
governments, both circumstances redounding to the high quality and 
neutrality of the product and its ability to reflect the present stage of 
consensus on international legal rules and principles governing 
international contractual obligation in the world, primarily on the basis 
of their fairness and appropriateness for international commercial 
transactions falling within their purview; 2) at the same time, the 
UNIDROIT Principles are largely inspired [by] an international 
uniform law text already enjoying wide international recognition and 
generally considered as reflecting international trade usages and 
practices in the field of the international sales of goods, which has 
already been ratified by almost 40 countries, namely the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods; 3) the UNIDROIT 
Principles are specially adapted to the Contracts being the subject of 
this arbitration, since they cover both the international sale of goods 
and supply of services; 4) the UNIDROIT Principles (see their 
Preamble) have been specifically conceived to apply to international 
contracts in instances in which, as it is the case in these proceedings, it 
has been found that the parties have agreed that their transactions 
shall be governed by general legal rules and principles; and 5) rather 
than vague principles or general guidelines, the UNIDROIT Principles 
are mostly constituted by clearly enunciated and specific rules 
coherently organized in a systematic way.49 
________________________________________________________________ 
 47. Id. at 48. 
 48. Id. at 49. 
 49. The arbitral tribunal referred to the following UNIDROIT Principles: 
Articles 1.7 (good faith and fair dealing in international trade), 2.4 (revocation of offer), 
2.14 (contract with terms deliberately left open), 2.18 (written modification clause), 
7.1.3 (withholding performance) and 7.4.8 (mitigation of harm). See UNIDROIT 
Principles, supra note 2, arts. 1.7, 2.4, 2.14, 2.18, 7.1.3, 7.4.8. 
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3.  Negative Choices and Application of the UNIDROIT Principles by 
Arbitrators: Award Number 7375 
 ICC Award Number 7375, rendered in Geneva on June 5, 1996, 
is crucial to negative choice-of-law doctrine in international 
commercial arbitration.50 It provides an interesting example of cases 
where a state, and not a private party, decides to commence 
arbitration against a multinational corporation, which, in turn, tries 
to resist by attacking the arbitrators’ jurisdiction. In Award Number 
7375, the Iranian government and the U.S. corporation Westinghouse 
had signed a series of contracts for the supply of military radars to be 
installed in Iran. The request for arbitration referred to the whole 
series of contracts dealing with the delivery or installment or 
maintenance of radar systems.  
 The arbitration clause was written in these terms: 
 All disputes arising out of or in relation to or in connection with this 
agreement which cannot amicably be settled by discussion and mutual 
accord, shall be finally settled by arbitration at Zurich, Switzerland, in 
accordance with the rules then in effect of the International Chamber of 
Commerce.  Notice of arbitration shall be given to the party or parties to 
whom demand therefore is addressed. Judgment upon the award 
rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators may be entered in any court 
having jurisdiction or application may be made to such court for judicial 
acceptance of the award and an order of enforcement, as the case may 
be.51 
 The initial issue to resolve was whether the plaintiff had 
standing in order to claim on the basis of a contract that had been 
signed between the (pre-revolution) Imperial Government of Iran and 
Westinghouse. The tribunal found that the Ministry of Defense was 
the successor in interest to the Imperial Government notwithstanding 
the fact that the latter had been overthrown by the Iranian 
revolution.  Moreover, Westinghouse itself had argued this theory in 
other cases when seeking damages from the Islamic Republic of Iran 
and, therefore, as such the corporation was prevented to present this 
argument under the light of a good faith criterion. 
 Westinghouse had argued that arbitration was not validly 
instituted as the claimant had not obtained Parliamentary approval, 
thereby violating the Iranian Constitution. The tribunal nonetheless 
rejected the defendant’s argument, inter alia, on the basis of Article 
177 of the Swiss PIL. The defendant also argued that there was no 
agreement to arbitrate on all contracts since only one contract 
contained an arbitration agreement. The tribunal agreed with this 
argument, rejecting the opposite argument presented by the claimant 
________________________________________________________________ 
 50. See ICC Award No. 7375, supra note 22. The integral publication of this 
sentence makes it possible to analyze it without the usual limits of the confidentiality.   
 51. Id.  
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and aiming to extend arbitral jurisdiction on the basis of an alleged 
course of dealing. 
 Once disputes concerning its jurisdiction had been resolved, the 
arbitrators passed on to the determination of the applicable law. The 
arbitrators noted that:  
[I]n many international disputes, the question of the law which is 
applicable is of rather peripheral or academic importance only, as the 
dispute will be decided on the basis of the terms of the relevant contract 
and, as far as necessary, an interpretation thereof, such that in most 
cases it will not be necessary to resort to an underlying applicable law 
for obtaining “legal guidance.”52 
None of the contracts contained a clause of choice of law and the 
claimant argued that Iranian law should apply while the defendant 
wanted Maryland law. The determination of the applicable law was 
crucial for the solution of the case: under post-revolutionary Iranian 
law, there is no time bar while under Maryland law, all of the Iranian 
Government’s claims are time-barred on the ground of the four-year 
statute of limitations. 
 The arbitrators reported that Iran did not want the application 
of another state law with these words: 
To corroborate its argument, Claimant argues that the application of 
general principles of law is particularly appropriate in connection with 
State contracts and says that contracts having a highly political content 
should be “denationalized” as far as possible.53 
Westinghouse, on the other hand, opposed in the strongest of terms 
both to the application of Iranian law and to the application of 
general principles of law.  In its pleadings, Westinghouse argued that 
it would not have agreed to enter into the contracts if they had to be 
made under Iranian law and that it considered the applicable law as 
Maryland law. In fact, Westinghouse had its place of business in 
Maryland and it had to manufacture the goods that it was required to 
supply there. Therefore, by virtue of general principles of 
international private law, Maryland law was the law with the closest 
connection to the case. 
The tribunal pointed out that the applicable law could be found by 
two methods, namely the objective and subjective methods.  Under 
the first method, the tribunal had to analyze the issue according to 
the conflict-of-laws principles thereby determining Maryland law as 
the applicable law to the case. However, the majority of arbitrators 
considered this method insufficient to solve the case because it failed 
to take into consideration the fact that the omission of a choice-of-law 
provision was not an accident but was specifically wanted by parties. 
In this case, none of the parties was willing to accept the law of the 
________________________________________________________________ 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id.  
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other parties to the contract. Hence a mechanical conflict 
determination would result in an outcome that nobody wanted. On 
this basis, the majority of arbitrators considered three possibilities: 
! To designate a neutral law as applicable; 
! To apply the tronc commun doctrine 
! To rely on general principles of international commercial law 
including the UNIDROIT Principles. 
 The first solution was rejected insofar as there are no objective 
connecting factors pointing towards the law of a third state.54 The 
second solution did not solve the problem since there is no tronc 
commun, or common principles, between Maryland and Iranian law 
precisely on the statute of limitations. The only method providing the 
solution for this case may be the application of general contract law 
principles and the lex mercatoria. 
 In this respect, arbitrators made an important statement. They 
affirmed that lex mercatoria has the function of safeguarding a kind 
of negative interest of the two parties. Lex mercatoria presents the 
advantage of protecting: 
[B]oth Parties against the application of a national law which might 
contain particular provisions which they had not expected, and which 
may not be suitable in a truly international context of the present 
nature. Freeing the parties from the constraints of a national law thus 
would ascertain and warrant that the dispute shall be decided by 
having regard to those rules of law and notions which deserve to be 
qualified as being “generally accepted”. Thus a decision based on 
generally accepted principles has moreover the advantage to ascertain 
foreseeability of the outcome and certainty of law.55 
The tribunal stressed the point that applying lex mercatoria is far 
more difficult than applying a particular domestic law:  
 This is so because an arbitrator, who can simply apply a national law, 
may not have to scrutinize and be concerned about the ‘validity’ and 
‘application-worthiness’ of a particular provision; he may and will 
simply apply the law (sometimes adding his own regrets: ‘dura lex, sed 
lex’). 
 However, an arbitrator who has to reflect on those rules and 
principles which truly deserve to be called ‘general principles,’ or 
forming part of a lex mercatoria (thus being carried by an international 
‘communis opinio vel necessitatis’), will have a much more difficult and 
responsible task to accomplish.56 
________________________________________________________________ 
 54. Id. (arbitrators asking: “Why Swiss Law and not Japanese? The choice of 
the situs of the arbitration (in casu Zurich/Switzerland) cannot in any way justify a 
conclusion that the Parties had intended to subject themselves to the Swiss 
substanntive [sic] Law”). 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
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Therefore, the arbitral tribunal, by majority vote,57 concluded that: 
 The tribunal will apply those general principles and rules of law 
applicable to international contractual obligations which qualify as 
rules of law and which have earned a wide acceptance and 
international consensus in the international business community, 
including notions which are said to form part of a Lex Mercatoria, also 
taking into account any relevant trade usages as well as the 
UNIDROIT Principles, as far as they can be considered to reflect 
generally accepted principles and rules.58 
If UNIDROIT Principles and lex mercatoria have proven crucial to 
solve the choice-of-law problem in these cases, one should note that 
the former do not necessarily represent trade usages or international 
practice. This is why their application shall always be carried out 
cum judicio and after accurate analysis.59   
 The end of the story was a mutually agreed solution out of court. 
Yet, the arbitrators clearly pointed out in the award that the 
principles of good faith in international business transactions 
prevented Iran from suing Westinghouse a decade after the Iranian 
revolution had cancelled any evidence defendant might have used for 
the case at stake. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 57. A dissenting opinion was produced by the Iranian arbitrator pleading for 
the application of Iranian law to the contract. The pleading, however, was based on 
conceptions which nowadays are outdated. He basically affirmed that in state contracts 
there is a presumption in favor of municipal law of the contracting state. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Among other examples of the same approach, it is worth to mention ICC 
Awards nos. 8261 and 8502. In the first award, the dispute concerned a contract 
between an Italian company and a Middle Eastern governmental agency. The contract 
did not contain any choice-of-law clause. In a partial award on the question of the 
applicable law, the arbitral tribunal decided that it would base its decision on the 
“terms of the contract, supplemented by general principles of trade as embodied in the 
lex mercatoria”. Subsequently, it referred, with no further explanation, to Articles 4.6 
(contra proferentem rule), 4.8 (supplying omitted terms), 7.4.1 (right to damages), 7.4.7 
(harm due in part to aggrieved party) and 7.4.13 (agreed payment for non-performance) 
of the UNIDROIT Principles, thereby implicitly considering the latter a source of the 
lex mercatoria. See U.L.R. at 171 (1999). In ICC Award No. 8502, a French and a Dutch 
buyers entered into a contract with a Vietnamese exporter for the supply of rice. 
Claimants (the buyers) alleged that Respondent failed to supply the rice. The sales 
contract contained an arbitration clause referring to ICC rules of arbitration. 
Respondent refuses to take part in arbitration proceedings. The contract did not 
contain any choice-of-law clause and the arbitral tribunal decided to base its award on 
“trade usages and generally accepted principles of international trade. In particular 
arbitrators applied the 1980 Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods [hereinafter, Vienna Sales Convention] and to the UNIDROIT Principles, as 
evidencing admitted practices under international trade law”. See Marrella & Gélinas, 
supra note 2, at 73. By referring to Articles 76 of the CISG and 7.4.6 (proof of harm by 
current price) of the UNIDROIT Principles, arbitrators reached the conclusion that 
respondent was in breach of its obligations since no case of force majeure preventing 
him from performing had occurred. 
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C. Is Renvoi Really Phantomatic? 
 A final remark on matters of choice of law should be made on 
renvoi. The UNIDROIT Principles, seen as part of an anational legal 
system, do not contain conflict of laws rules. This character of the 
UNIDROIT Principles seems to be in line with modern private 
international law of contracts and with arbitral regulations. The 
constant rule in modern instruments (see i.e. 1980 Rome Convention 
on the law applicable to contractual obligations, Article 15) is 
precisely that whenever there is election of the applicable law, be it 
by the parties or by the arbitrators, this choice should be limited to 
substantive rules, excluding conflict of law rules of the lex contractus. 
Although the drafter of the UNIDROIT Principles had this situation 
in mind, new problems are on the horizon as demonstrated by the 
Arthur Andersen Award (ICC Award Number 9797).  
 In that case, the arbitrator resolved a global litigation by 
referring to the UNIDROIT Principles and to the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL).60 The former were further used to 
establish a number of important conclusions such as: (a) the “member 
firms’ implicit obligation to cooperate and to pursue their professional 
practice in accordance with the principles of good faith and fair 
dealing inherent to international contracts;”61 (b) party Z’s duty of 
best efforts “to ensure cooperation, coordination and compatibility 
among the member firms’ practices:”62 (c) release of the parties from 
their obligation to carry out and receive further performance, upon 
termination of their contract;63 and (d) the impossibility for party X to 
________________________________________________________________ 
 60. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 4.1(1) (“A contract shall be 
interpreted according to the common intention of the parties.”); Principles of European 
Contract Law [PECL], art. 5:101(1) (“A contract is to be interpreted according to the 
common intention of the parties even if this differs from the literal meaning of the 
word”); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 4.1(2) (“If such an intention cannot be 
established, the contract shall be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable 
persons of the same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstance.”); 
PECL, art. 5.101(3) (“If an intention cannot be established according to (1) or (2), the 
contract is to be interpreted according to the meaning that reasonable persons of the 
same kind as the parties would give to it in the same circumstance”). 
 61. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2 (“(1) Each party must act in 
accordance with good faith and fair dealing in international trade, (2) The parties may 
not exclude or limit this duty”). 
 62. See id. art. 5.4.2 (“To the extent that an obligation of a party involves a 
duty of best efforts in the performance of an activity, that party is bound to make such 
efforts as would be made by a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstance”). 
 63. See id. art. 7.3.1(1) (“A party may terminate the contract where the failure 
of the other party to perform an obligation under the contract amounts to a 
fundamental non-performance”); id. art. 7.3.5(1) (“Termination of the contract releases 
both parties from their obligation to effect and to receive future performance”). 
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claim full compensation as defined in Article 7.4.2 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles.64 
 This award illustrates how third-millennium arbitrations are 
becoming increasingly affected by the multiplication of general 
principles of contract law. In Award Number 9797, the arbitrator felt 
it was necessary to refer to two sets of principles, which is in itself 
striking as the case was a good example of global litigation, where the 
UNIDROIT Principles could have sufficed. In this case, this was of 
little importance: the Principles used to resolve the dispute were 
almost identical in the two collections (UNIDROIT and PECL). What 
would happen if they were different? A conflict of principles would 
have arisen and therefore rules on conflict of principles might be a 
good solution to avoid such an impasse. A rule like specialia 
generalibus derogant would suffice to resolve these new forms of 
conflict of rules and should be considered implicit in the UNIDROIT 
Principles.  
 Hence, are we facing a new form of renvoi? Two European 
contractors decide to choose as the applicable law the UNIDROIT 
Principles; since the PECL’s sphere of application would match with 
the case, should the arbitrator apply the PECL because of the 
unwritten lex specialis rule? Are we saying that there is a renvoi 
among anational rules? So far, no conclusive answer seems to be 
available. At the same time, there is a risk that such multiplication 
may undermine the UNIDROIT Principles and complicate choice-of-
law problems in international arbitration. 
IV. UNFORESEEN APPLICATIONS OF THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES: 
INTERPRETATION OF THE NATIONAL LEX CONTRACTUS 
 Beyond constituting a novum genus of applicable law to 
substance, lex mercatoria and the UNIDROIT Principles are ever 
more frequently being employed in the context of the application of a 
domestic law. Here, as the experience of state contracts has shown, 
arbitrators may combine national law and general principles of law in 
order to reach a legal conclusion consistent with needs of 
predictability and capable of enjoying international consensus. 
________________________________________________________________ 
64. The aggrieved party is entitled to full compensation for harm sustained 
as a result of the non-performance. Such harm includes both any loss 
which it suffered and any gain of which it was deprived, taking into 
account any gain to the aggrieved party resulting from its avoidance of 
cost or harm; Such harm may be non-pecuniary and includes, for 
instance, physical suffering or emotional distress. 
Id. 
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 Another species inside this taxonomy of cases can be found 
whenever international arbitrators interpret the applicable national 
law and, in particular, the so-called “general clauses”65 (notions à 
contenu variable; Generalklauseln) throughout transnational rules 
including the UNIDROIT Principles. 
 Peculiarly, the Preamble to the UNIDROIT Principles and their 
Commentary do not foresee such a use but arbitral practice has shown 
a clear trend in the opposite sense—rejoining mixed arbitration case 
law. The Preamble of the UNIDROIT Principles provides only for using 
the Principles as a substitute for the domestic law otherwise applicable 
in situations where it is extremely difficult or impossible to determine 
the relevant rule of the lex contractus.66 No reference is made to other 
situations, i.e. if and when the relevant domestic law may be applied 
taking into account transnational rules. The Commentary states:  
The Principles may however become relevant even where the contract 
is governed by a particular domestic law. This is the case whenever it 
proves extremely difficult if not impossible to establish the relevant 
rule of that particular domestic law with respect to a specific issue and 
a solution can be found in the Principles. The reasons for such a 
difficulty generally lie in the special character of the legal sources 
and/or the cost of access to them. 
Recourse to the Principles as a substitute for the domestic law 
otherwise applicable is of course to be seen as a last resort; on the other 
hand, it may be justified not only in the event of the absolute 
impossibility of establishing the relevant rule of the applicable law, but 
also whenever the research involved would entail disproportionate 
efforts and/or costs. The current practice of courts in such situations is 
that of applying the lex fori. Recourse to the Principles would have the 
advantage of avoiding the application of a law which will in most cases 
be more familiar to one of the parties.67 
The analysis of arbitral practice shows that these planned for 
situations appear, to the international arbitrator, as somewhat 
marginal if not insignificant. Instead, the UNIDROIT Principles have 
been applied under the perspective of interpreting and integrating a 
domestic lex contractus in 18 out of 38 cases that is, about 48 percent 
of ICC cases.68 
 In this category of applications, arbitrators have applied the 
proper domestic law analyzing it through the conceptual matrix 
offered by the Principles.  In this way, domestic law has been applied 
in a sort of de-localized fashion. After giving an example of this line of 
________________________________________________________________ 
 65. The common lawyer will greatly benefit from reading the following, though 
mainly conceived under an Anglo-German perspective: B.S. MARKESINIS ET AL., THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RESTITUTION: A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION 21-23 (1997). 
 66. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, pmbl.  
 67. Id. cmt. 
 68. See ICC Awards Nos. 5835, 8223, 8240, 8264, 8486, 8540, 8908, 9117, 9333, 
9593 and their excerpts, discussed in Marrella & Gélinas, supra note 2. 
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cases, we will point out to what we have called the risk of the lex 
cognita approach. 
A.  A New Instrument for International Arbitrators: the TNT Test  
 Transnational rules, be they from the lex mercatoria or the 
UNIDROIT Principles, may sometimes be found by selecting those 
domestic rules that converge with the UNIDROIT Principles.  Hence, 
it becomes clear that another way to avoid local solutions is simply to 
highlight rules of a specific domestic law enjoying wide international 
consensus. In other words, UNIDROIT Principles may be used by 
arbitrators to give a transnational status to (national) applicable law.  
 From this perspective, the UNIDROIT Principles may be used by 
arbitrators to carry out what I wish to label as the transnational test 
(or the T-test, or even the TNT test) of legal solutions found in the 
applicable domestic law. If what we have observed holds true, it 
follows that we may face a turning point in the evolution of conflict-
of-law methods in arbitration. 
 Classical criticism, according to which the conflict-of-law method 
is not adapted to the discipline of transnational economic relations, 
may be partially overturned. The criticism that the conflict-of-law 
method—especially under the savignian approach—gives a parochial 
solution of domestic law to transnational economic transactions may 
be bypassed through the transnational test carried out ex post by 
arbitrators. Once the proper domestic law has been determined, 
arbitrators will dispose of an objective instrument to verify if those 
specific rules drawn from the domestic legal system are in tune with 
those elementary and universal principles of international contract 
law contained in the UNIDROIT Principles. Summing up, the method 
of transnational rules may well represent, in the context of classical 
private international law,69 a new method in matters of adaptation of 
foreign law. 
B.  A First Example: ICC Award Number 8264 
 Again, the best explanation of this approach may be found in an 
actual case: ICC Award Number 8264 rendered in 1997. A U.S. civil 
engineering equipment manufacturer signed an agreement with an 
Algerian state-owned industrial development corporation relating to 
the design, production, start-up and initial management of industrial 
facilities. Annexed to the agreement was a contract between the same 
parties providing for the transfer of industrial property rights and 
know-how useful to the activities covered in the main contract. The 
________________________________________________________________ 
 69. See, e.g., DICEY & MORRIS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (Lawrence Collins 
ed., 1993).  
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Algerian party agreed to pay a fixed sum and a proportional fee for 
each machine manufactured.   
 After some time, the U.S. manufacturer accused the other party 
of stopping payment of the proportional fees without justification, of 
furnishing incomplete dispatch reports, and subsequently of sending 
no reports at all.  The Algerian corporation considered itself justified 
in stopping payment of the fees, due to the claimant’s failure to 
provide improvements likely to be relevant to production. 
Accordingly, it sought compensation for damages. In the contract, the 
arbitration clause was formulated as follows: “All differences arising 
out from this agreement will be resolved definitively according to the 
Regulations of conciliation and arbitration of the International 
Chamber of Commerce in Paris, by one or more arbitrators named in 
accordance with this regulation.”70 
 Arbitrators established the seat in Paris and, noting an absence 
of choice of the applicable law, decided as follows: “[t]he arbitral 
tribunal will take into account: applicable laws in Algeria which 
govern this agreement, as well as performance of consequent 
agreements, of the reasonable forecasts of the parts in the light of the 
objectives, the reasons and the goals of convention, and the general 
principles of law and international trade usages.”71 Making reference 
to general principles in order to determine if incomplete performance 
depended on any causes of nullity of the contract as pleaded during 
proceedings, the arbitral tribunal decided that, according to general 
principles of law, nonperformance (from both sides) of the contract did 
not mean at all its cancellation or its nullity. Instead, it evidenced the 
common will of the parties of producing legal effects. That solution 
was adopted by Article 106 of the Algerian Civil Code, which stated 
that “the contract makes the laws of the parties. It cannot be revoked 
nor modified without mutual assent or for the causes envisaged by 
the law.”72 
________________________________________________________________ 
 70. ICC Award No. 8264 (author’s translation). The original text states:  
Tous differends découlant de la présente convention seront tranchés 
définitivement suivent le Règlement de conciliation et d’arbitrage de la 
Chambre de Commerce Internationale de Paris, par un ou plusieurs arbitres 
nommés conformément à ce Règlement. 
 71. Id. (author’s translation).  The original text states:  
Le tribunal arbitral tiendra compte: des lois applicables en Algérie qui 
régissent cette convention, ainsi que l’exécution des accords qui en sont la suite 
ou la conséquence, des prévisions raisonnables des parties à la lumière des 
objectifs, des motifs et des buts de la convention, et des principes généraux du 
droit et des usages du commerce international. 
 72. Id. (author’s translation).  The original text states: 
Au regard des principes généraux du droit des contrats, son inexécution (qui est 
d’ailleurs le fait des deux parties) ne saurait entraîner ni son annulation, ni, 
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 Hence, the arbitral tribunal considered the respondent to have 
fulfilled its duty to forward the dispatch reports and to provide 
information on the changes made to the licensed products. It then 
determined that payment of the proportional fees was still 
outstanding. Additionally, since the U.S. claimant’s duty was limited 
to improvements to the products and equipment covered by the 
contract, the claimant did not provide necessary information leading 
to a loss of opportunity for the respondent, thus breaching the rule 
contained in Article 7.4.3(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles.73 The 
tribunal also estimated the harm caused at one-tenth of the sum 
claimed and ordered this to be offset against the fees due by the 
respondent to the claimant. It decided not to order payment of 
interest on overdue amounts, as the claimant’s omissions were largely 
to account for the lack of payment. In conclusion, this example 
illustrates—though in the context of an arbitration clause 
particularly “open” to application of principles—the possible interplay 
between a domestic law (i.e. Algerian law) and transnational rules 
codified in the UNIDROIT Principles.   
C.  A New Risk for the Development of International Arbitration: The 
Lex Cognita Approach  
 Ubi commoda et ibi incommoda, we have to acknowledge that 
finding the convergence between transnational rules and domestic 
law may sometimes be an illusion. The potential problem, using the 
UNIDROIT Principles in such a context, is that they may also be 
used as a good justification for a lack of reasoning in the choice of the 
applicable rules of law. Arbitrators may face the temptation to use 
more or less openly what has been called a lex cognita approach.74 
This situation may occur whenever arbitrators apply only the rules of 
their national law, motivating that the solution would have been the 
same had the UNIDROIT Principles been applied. The risk is that, 
instead of representing a step forward in the evolution of 
                                                                                                                      
comme les prétend [la demanderesse, n.d.r.] sa caducité. Il reste l’expression de 
la volonté commune des parties et conserve sa force obligatoire tant qu’il n’a 
pas été résolu. C’est également la règle du Code Civil Algérien, dont l’article 
106 dispose que “le contrat fait la lois des parties. Il ne peut être révoqué ni 
modifié que de leur consentement mutuel ou pour les causes prévues par la loi. 
 73. Id. (author’s translation).  The original text states:  
En droit du commerce international, ‘la perte d’une chance peut être réparée 
dans la mesure de la probabilité de sa realization.’ Ainsi s’expriment les 
Principes d’UNIDROIT relatifs aux commerce international (article 7.4.3, a. 
l.2), qui consacrent, comme on le sait des règles très largement admises à 
travers le monde dans le systèmes juridiques et la pratique des contrats 
internationaux. 
 74. See generally Marrella & Gélinas, supra note 2. 
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international business law, the UNIDROIT Principles might be used 
to mask what is in fact a poorly reasoned selection and a strict 
application of domestic law (the national law of the arbitrator) to an 
international transaction. 
 Motivation in arbitration awards becomes a means of control for 
the parties over the reasons arbitrators have found to choose any set 
of rules, be they national or anational. Top arbitrators have always 
shown a real punctilio on choice-of-law issues and the same precision 
should serve to distinguish good from bad awards. It is now 
interesting to look at cases in which arbitrators have applied the 
UNIDROIT Principles as a means to interpret international 
conventions. 
D.  Transnational Rules and International Uniform Law Conventions  
 Another category of arbitral applications of the UNIDROIT 
Principles consists of using them in order to resolve matters of 
interpretation or, eventually, to fill gaps in international conventions 
such as CISG.75 Without entering into the continuing debate over 
national versus autonomous means of interpreting and 
supplementing international uniform law conventions,76 we here 
simply focus on the position of the arbitrator. From this standpoint, 
transnational rules may become applicable at least through the 
renvoi contained in the convention towards general principles. The 
theorem is simple in its basic assumption: if and only if the 
convention is applicable, it follows, coeteris paribus, that 
transnational rules may be applied on the ground of a specific rule 
contained in the particular convention at issue. 
 Then again, in case of doubts on the precise meaning of rules of 
an international uniform law convention, the solution may be found 
in transnational rules, such as the lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT 
Principles. After considering the state of the art of ICC arbitral 
practice on this specific point, including a practical example, I shall 
illustrate further applications of the interpretation and gap filling 
method. 
1.  Arbitral Practice 
 In ICC arbitral practice, UNIDROIT Principles have been used 
as a means of interpretation and supplementation of international 
conventions in at least five cases which, in perspective, allow us to 
________________________________________________________________ 
 75. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 7. 
 76. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 2d. ed. 1998); M. 
Gebauer, Uniform Law, General Principles and Autonomous Interpretation, 5 UNIFORM 
L. REV. 683, 683-705 (2000). 
2003] INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1173 
estimate this group at approximately 13 percent of all UNIDROIT 
awards.77 In this line of arbitral jurisprudence, arbitrators have 
employed the Principles mainly in the context of interpreting the 
1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG).  
The nexus between the CISG and the Principles may be found in 
Article 7 of the Vienna Convention where it is stated that:   
 (1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had 
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in 
its application and the observance of good faith in international trade.  
 (2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention 
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with 
the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules 
of private international law.78 
Therefore, the need of “international interpretation” of the CISG is 
satisfied by UNIDROIT Principles as it will be seen in the following 
example. 
2.  One Practical Example: ICC Award Number 8769 
 A practical example of this line of cases may be found in ICC 
Award Number 8769.79 The parties entered into a manufacturing 
contract, plus a tooling agreement related to it. The claimant alleged 
a breach of contract by the respondent, referring to misleading 
conduct in negotiations, failure to meet technical specifications, 
misuse of tooling, and non-registration of patent.  The respondent 
objected and filed a counterclaim to cover balance of tooling costs, 
unused packaging and materials, warehouse costs, settlement 
payment for termination of licensing agreement, additional 
machinery costs, outstanding invoices, and lost profits. The sole 
arbitrator applied French law and the 1980 Vienna Convention on 
contracts for the international sale of goods (CISG), in accordance 
with the agreement reached by the parties in the arbitration clause.  
He rejected the claimant’s demands and granted the respondent’s 
counterclaims.  In awarding interests, he referred to Article 7.4.9(2) 
of the UNIDROIT Principles relating to the rate of interest.  
 Thus, Article 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT Principles has been allowed 
to fill gaps in Article 78 of the CISG by determining the legal 
autonomy of the right to interests for failure to pay money whether or
________________________________________________________________ 
 77. See Award Nos. 8128, 8769, 8817, discussed in Marrella & Gélinas, supra 
note 2. 
 78. Vienna Sales Convention, supra note 29, art. 7. 
 79. Id. at 75. 
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not the non-payment is excused.80 The same approach has also been 
used when arbitrators have been confronted with the problem of 
________________________________________________________________ 
 80. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, at art. 7.4.9 (interest for failure to pay 
money states): 
(1) If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the aggrieved party 
is entitled to interest upon that sum from the time when payment is due to the 
time of payment whether or not the non-payment is excused; (2) The rate of 
interest shall be the average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers 
prevailing for the currency of payment at the place for payment, or where no 
such rate exists at that place, then the same rate in the State of the currency of 
payment. In the absence of such a rate at either place the rate of interest shall 
be the appropriate rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency of payment; 
(3) The aggrieved party is entitled to additional damages if the non-payment 
caused it a greater harm.  
The UNIDROIT commentary to Article 7.4.9 states:  
1. Lump sum compensation for failure to pay a sum of money.  
 This article reaffirms the widely accepted rule according to which the harm 
resulting from delay in the payment of a sum of money is subject to a special 
regime and is calculated by a lump sum corresponding to the interest accruing 
between the time when payment of the money was due and the time of actual 
payment.   
 Interest is payable whenever the delay in payment is attributable to the non-
performing party, and this as from the time when payment was due, without 
any need for the aggrieved party to give notice of the default.  If the delay is the 
consequence of force majeure (e.g. the non-performing party is prevented from 
obtaining the sum due by reason of the introduction of new exchange control 
regulations), interest will still be due not as damages but as compensation for 
the enrichment of the debtor as a result of the non-payment as the debtor 
continues to receive interest on the sum which it is prevented from paying.  
 The harm is calculated as a lump sum. In other words, subject to para. (3) of 
this article, the aggrieved party may not prove that it could have invested the 
sum due at a higher rate of interest or the non-performing party that the 
aggrieved party would have obtained interest at a rate lower than the average 
lending rate referred to in para. (2).The parties may of course agree in advance 
on a different rate of interest (which would in effect subject it to Art. 7.4.13).  
2. Rate of interest  
 Paragraph two of this article fixes in the first instance as the rate of interest 
the average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers. This solution 
seems to be that best suited to the needs of international trade and most 
appropriate to ensure an adequate compensation of the harm sustained. The 
rate in question is the rate at which the aggrieved party will normally borrow 
the money which it has not received from the non-performing party. That 
normal rate is the average bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers 
prevailing at the place for payment for the currency of payment. 
 No such rate may however exist for the currency of payment at the place for 
payment. In such cases, reference is made in the first instance to the average 
prime rate in the State of the currency of payment. For instance, if a loan is 
made in pounds sterling payable at Tunis and there is no rate for loans in 
pounds on the Tunis financial market, reference will be made to the rate in the 
United Kingdom. 
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determining the interest rate to use as a base for determining the 
total amount of the sum due for the lacking payment.  
3.  Future Applications 
 Future applications in this category of cases may concern other 
international uniform law conventions containing rules of 
interpretation referring to needs of uniformity in the application of 
the convention or even a reference to concepts of “good faith in 
international trade.” Actually, these formulas seem recurrent in a 
certain number of conventions regulating international business law. 
 We may thus refer to the UNIDROIT Convention on 
International Factoring of May 28, 1988, where Article 4 states: 
 1. - In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
object and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its international 
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith in international trade. 
 2. - Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which 
are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the 
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules 
of private international law.81 
Again, in Article 14 of the 1991 U.N. Convention on the Liability of 
Operators of Transport Terminals in International Trade, it is stated 
that: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to 
                                                                                                                      
 In the absence of such a rate at either place, the rate of interest will be the 
“appropriate” rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency of payment. In 
most cases this will be the legal rate of interest and, as there may be more than 
one, that most appropriate for international transaction. If there is no legal 
rate of interest, the rate will be the most appropriate bank rate.  
3. Additional damages recoverable  
 Interest is intended to compensate the harm normally sustained as a 
consequence of delay in payment of a sum of money. Such delay may however 
cause additional harm to the aggrieved party for which it may recover 
damages, always provided that it can prove the existence of such harm and 
that it meets the requirements of certainty and foreseeability (para. (3)).  
 81. The same approach may be found in Article 6 of the UNIDROIT Convention 
on International Financial Leasing, May 20, 1988, available at http://www.unidroit.org/ 
english/conventions/c-leas.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2003): 
1. In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its object 
and purpose as set forth in the preamble, to its international character and to 
the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade. 
2.   Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not 
expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles 
on which it is based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the 
law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law.” 
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its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in 
its application.”82 
 Finally, another example may be found at Article 3 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea of 30 March 
1978 (The Hamburg Rules) where, it is expressly stated that: “In the 
interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention 
regard shall be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity.” Moreover, the Hamburg Rules are inspired on 
the base of the favor arbitri as it is revealed at Article 22 of such 
rules.83 
 In conclusion, as long as international uniform law conventions 
provide for such rules of interpretation referring to general principles 
and the need for a uniform application, it seems that transnational 
rules such as the UNIDROIT Principles and the lex mercatoria may 
________________________________________________________________ 
 82. U.N. Convention on the Liberty of Operators of Transport Terminals in 
International Trade, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 152/13 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1503 
(1991). 
 83. U.N. Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, art. 22, Mar. 30, 1978. 
Article 22- Arbitration 
 1. Subject to the provisions of this Article, parties may provide by 
agreement evidenced in writing that any dispute that may arise relating to 
carriage of goods under this Convention shall be referred to arbitration. 
 2. Where a charter-party contains a provision that disputes arising 
thereunder shall be referred to arbitration and a bill of lading issued pursuant 
to the charterparty does not contain a special annotation providing that such 
provision shall be binding upon the holder of the bill of lading, the carrier may 
not invoke such provision as against a holder having acquired the bill of lading 
in good faith. 
 3. The arbitration proceedings shall, at the option of the Claimant, be 
instituted at one of the following places: 
  (a) A place in a State within whose territory is situated: 
   (i) The principal place of business of the Defendant or, in the 
absence thereof, the habitual residence of the Defendant; or 
   (ii) The place where the contract was made, provided that the 
Defendant has there a place of business, branch or agency through 
which the contract was made; or 
   (iii) The port of loading or the port of discharge; or 
  (b) Any place designated for that purpose in the arbitration clause or 
agreement. 
 4. The arbitrator or arbitration tribunal shall apply the rules of this 
Convention. 
 5. The provisions of paragraph 3 and 4 of this Article are deemed to be part 
of every arbitration clause or agreement, and any term of such clause or 
agreement which is inconsistent therewith is null and void. 
 6. Nothing in this Article affects the validity of an agreement relating to 
arbitration made by the parties after the claim under the contract of carriage 
by sea has arisen. 
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supply the necessary rules to fill gaps and avoid ambiguities.84  
Arbitrators are specialists in international trade and business law 
and they will select with care those transnational rules which are 
useful to resolve the dispute. In the right hands, the method of 
transnational rules is a plus and never a minus for international 
arbitrators. 
E. Excluding the UNIDROIT Principles 
 For a complete analysis of the role of the UNIDROIT Principles 
and their relationship with lex mercatoria, great attention must be 
paid to awards in which the application of the UNIDROIT Principles 
has been excluded.85 These cases have shown that an arbitration 
clause pointing to a given domestic law with the express exclusion of 
every other legal system has the result of excluding the application 
both of the lex mercatoria and of the UNIDROIT Principles. 
Furthermore, another award has shown that the UNIDROIT 
Principles do not constitute per se a codification of international trade 
usages. On the contrary, the characterization of a specific UNIDROIT 
principle within the category of international trade usages needs 
demonstration.   
 International commercial law of the third millennium thus 
seems to be heading towards a progressive differentiation between 
principles of contract law including the UNIDROIT Principles and 
international trade usages.86 This process will have a profound 
impact on the application of the ubiquitous formula common in 
arbitration regulations, national statutes, and international 
conventions, according to which the arbitrator shall take account of 
relevant trade usages. Between 1994 and the end of 2000, three cases 
(8 percent of the total) mentioned the UNIDROIT Principles in order 
to exclude their application.87 In ICC Award Number 9419, the 
arbitrator simply declared not to adhere to doctrines of either lex 
mercatoria or the UNIDROIT Principles. Therefore he opted for a 
________________________________________________________________ 
 84. In the matters of international bills of exchange, a domain which has 
represented a sort of laboratory of uniform law, the recent UNCITRAL Convention on 
International Bills of Exchange and International Promissory Notes, 1988, provides in 
Article 4, that: “In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its 
international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and 
the observance of good faith in international transaction.” 
 85. This important category of cases has been analyzed by the author in 
Marrella & Gélinas, supra note 2. 
 86. See Roy Goode, Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law, 
46 INT’L COMP. L.Q. 1 (1997); Emmanuel Gaillard, La distinction des principes généraux 
du droit et des usages du commerce international, in ETUDES BELLET 203.  
 87. See ICC Awards Nos. 8873, 9029 and 9419, discussed in Marrella & 
Gélinas, supra note 2, at 78-81, 88-96, 104-06. 
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traditional application of conflict of laws rules in order to localize the 
contract in a domestic legal system. 
 ICC Award Number 9029 is far more interesting. In that case, 
arbitrators faced a choice-of-law clause in favor of Italian law as the 
applicable law. One of the parties asked for the UNIDROIT Principles 
or lex mercatoria to be applied, inter alia, on the basis of Italian rules 
concerning international commercial arbitration and namely Article 
834 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure in which reference is made 
to trade usages.  The arbitral tribunal rejected such an interpretation 
in favor of a strict application of the applicable domestic law.  
Nonetheless, arbitrators went on to show that, had they applied 
UNIDROIT Principles or lex mercatoria, the result would have been 
the same had Italian law been applied.   
 The most striking example of this line of cases is, however, ICC 
Award Number 8873. In connection with the construction of a road in 
Algeria, the claimant, a French company, entered into a contract with 
Respondent 1, a Spanish company, whose rights were assigned to 
Respondent 2, another Spanish Company. As the claimant fell behind 
schedule in performing the work, Respondent 2 asked it to increase 
its resources so as to make up the lost time. The claimant’s 
justification for the delay was deterioration in political conditions in 
Algeria, which, it alleged, prevented it from mobilizing the necessary 
personnel and extra-work requested by Respondent 2. It suggested 
that the terms of their collaboration should be renegotiated, filing a 
claim to cease the work on grounds of force majeure. 
 An amendment was subsequently drawn up and various changes 
were made to the initial contract.  The work continued but fell behind 
schedule again. Respondent 2, therefore, claimed penalty payments 
for late performance and made the payment of invoices subject to the 
claimant’s issuing a credit note covering the amount of the penalties. 
A deadlock ensued, with the claimant refusing to sign the credit notes 
and asking for sums invoiced to be paid and Respondent 2 refusing to 
pay the invoices until it had received the credit notes.  In the face of 
this situation, the claimant introduced its request for arbitration 
referring to hardship and force majeure to account for the delay in the 
performance of the work. Its claims concerned outstanding invoices 
due for payment by Respondent 2 and various additional costs that it 
had been caused to incur. Respondent 2 made a counterclaim in order 
to obtain payment of the penalties for late performance and to be 
covered for certain additional costs it had been caused to incur.   
 The arbitration clause was read: 
 Arbitration and choice of law.  This contract shall be entirely 
governed by Spanish Law, excluding any other legal system. Any 
dispute arising in connection with the interpretation, validity or any 
effect of the contract, shall be settled by arbitration which shall take 
place in Madrid (Spain) under the Rule of conciliation and arbitration 
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of the International Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrors 
appointed in accordance with said rules.88 
 The arbitral tribunal, sitting in Madrid, determined the 
applicable law to the merits as being Spanish Law. However, 
according to the claimant, the dispute was not to be decided only on 
the basis of Spanish law, but taking into proper account international 
trade usages. This reasoning would lead to apply general principles of 
law and, in particular, usages in the field of public procurements 
(usages existants dans les contrats internationationaux de génie 
civil).89 
 The defendant pleaded against this approach showing that, 
under Spanish law, the contrato de obras is disciplined by the civil 
code. Therefore, usages and customs would have been effective 
secundum legem, that is, within the limits set forth by Spanish civil 
law rules, regardless of all other commercial considerations. In order 
to resolve this issue, arbitrators recalled Article 13 of the ICC 
Regulations and Article VII of the 1961 Geneva Convention, 
observing that they were not bound to follow strictly any national law 
when determining the effects of trade usages for the transaction.90 
They added that, when there is a question of determining the role of 
trade usages, the Geneva Convention, via the rules of its Article VII, 
allows the arbitrators a very broad discretionary margin. This 
discretionary power results in attributing international trade usages 
a legal force which can be limited only in the presence of mandatory 
rules of the lex contractus. From this perspective, a rule can be 
ascribed to trade usages only if it is widely known and regularly 
observed in a given trade.91 
 According to the claimant, hardship rules may be found in the 
UNIDROIT Principles92 and constitute a common clause in 
international standard contracts.  In particular, hardship clauses are 
________________________________________________________________ 
 88. ICC Award No. 8873, discussed in Marrella & Gélinas, supra note 2. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See ICC Award No. 8873 (author’s translation). The original text of the 
award states, “[Les arbitres] ne sont pas liés aux règles strictes d’un droit national 
lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer si, et dans quelle mesure, les usages du commerce 
peuvent s’appliquer, éventuellement en substitution de normes dispositives de la loi 
applicable.” 
 91. Therefore, according to arbitrators: 
il faut par conséquent établir qu’il s’agit de règles que les personnes engagées 
dans le commerce international (et en particulier dans la branche en question) 
considèrent applicables sans aucun besoin d’une référence expresse, parce 
qu’elles sont devenues obligatoires comme conséquence d’un usage répandu et 
continu.  Il est évident que cette appréciation doit être faite avec prudence, afin 
d’éviter que les parties se trouvent soumises à des règles dont elles ne 
pouvaient pas attendre raisonnablement qu’elles soient applicable. 
ICC Award No. 8873. 
 92. See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, arts. 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3.  
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contained both in FIDIC (edition IV) and in ENAA conditions (ENAA 
Model form International Contract for Process Plant Construction). 
 With regard to the legal nature of the UNIDROIT Principles, the 
arbitral tribunal noted that those Principles could find an application 
when the parties have agreed that their contract should be governed 
by them. In the specific case at issue, parties had not made any 
reference to the Principles. Therefore, it followed that the UNIDROIT 
Principles were not applicable.  Moreover, arbitrators added that: 
The only means to justify their application would be of saying that they 
[the UNIDROIT Principles] are a codification of existing usages. In 
order to reach this conclusion it would be necessary to prove that the 
rules called upon by Claimant (and in particular those on Hardship, 
contained in articles 6.2.1 and following) correspond to a generally 
established international practice, which people engaged in 
international trade consider as binding regardless its written 
stipulation.93  
 However, the arbitral tribunal considered that although there is 
a tendency to stipulate hardship clauses in certain sectors of 
international trade in a repetitive way, in business practice an 
obligation of renegotiation of the contract constitutes a principle of 
exceptional matters notwithstanding rules of the UNIDROIT 
Principles. Furthermore, one has to consider the degree of detail with 
which the hardship clauses are stipulated.  If hardship clauses must 
be stipulated in the contract and detailed, it follows that they cannot 
be considered trade usages since their content varies from time to 
time. 
 The conclusion of the tribunal was the following: 
It is thus excluded that provisions on Hardship contained in the 
UNIDROIT Principles are trade usages. On the contrary, they do not 
correspond, at least at present times, to current practice of business in 
international trade and therefore their applicability depends on an 
express contractual reference from the parties, which is not the case at 
issue.94 
________________________________________________________________ 
 93. ICC Award No. 8873 (author’s translation).  The original text is as follows: 
Le seul moyen pour justifier leur application serait de dire qu’il s’agit d’une 
“codification” des usages existants et que le Principes d’UNIDROIT devraient 
être appliqués dans cette qualité d’usages codifiés par l’UNIDROIT. Pour 
arriver à cette conclusion il faudrait prouver que les règles invoquées par la 
demanderesse (et en particulier celles sur la Hardship, contenus dans les 
articles 6.2.1 et suivants) correspondent à un usage international généralement 
établi, auquel les personnes engagées dans le commerce international se 
considèrent liées sans besoin d’une stipulation expresse dans ce sen. 
 94. ICC Award No. 8873 (author’s translation).  The original text is as follows:  
Il est donc exclu que l’on puisse considérer les dispositions en matière de 
Hardship contenues dans les Principes d’UNIDROIT comme des usages du 
commerce.  Il s’agit, au contraire, de règles qui ne correspondent pas, au moins 
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Once decided against the application of the UNIDROIT Principles to 
the case at stake, arbitrators considered the issue of applicability of 
FIDIC and ENAA Conditions.  
 FIDIC and ENAA general conditions of contract were 
characterized as standard contracts. In such a situation, these rules 
would have been applicable only if the parties had expressly or 
implicitly made reference to them.  Nonetheless, arbitrators observed 
that principles contained in standard contracts, typical of certain 
economic sectors of trade, can become usages.  Therefore, standard 
contracts may become trade usages whenever it is proven that they 
are applied, without need of agreement, in transactions among 
companies of a given economic sector. 
 In other words, according to the arbitral tribunal, two conditions 
must be matched: 
Rules must be established in practice of business with a sufficient 
degree of uniformity in order to be applied directly (like standard 
formulas) without need to negotiate further elements . . . [and secondly] 
that the same rules or principles are applied by economic operators of 
the branch in question even in absence of an express clause in the 
contract.95  
As the claimant’s invoked hardship and force majeure principles were 
based on FIDIC and ENAA clauses, it followed, once again, that 
arbitrators faced rules of an exceptional nature which, in their 
opinion, did not seem yet sufficiently “ripe” to be transformed into 
uniform and autonomous rules on that specific issue. From this 
perspective, arbitrators finally concluded that those principles 
represented mere “contractual formulas.”  As such, those rules had no 
legal value beyond the context of the standard contract containing 
them. As the tribunal correctly noted, the claimant had not shown 
that both the UNIDROIT Principles and the FIDIC or ENAA 
conditions formed a usage that parties knew or ought to have known, 
and which in international trade is widely known by parties to 
contracts of the particular trade concerned. For all these reasons, the 
application of hardship rules contained in UNIDROIT principles as 
well as in FIDIC and ENAA conditions were rejected. 
                                                                                                                      
à l’état actuel, à la pratique courante des affaires dans le commerce 
international et qui ne seront par conséquent applicables que lorsque les 
parties y ont fait une référence expresse, ce qui n’est pas le cas ici. 
 95. ICC Award No. 8873 (author’s translation).  The original text is as follows : 
[Q]u’il s’agisse de solutions établies dans la pratique des affaires avec un degré 
suffisant d’uniformité pour pouvoir être appliquées directement (comme 
formule standard) sans besoin de négocier des éléments ulterieurs; qu’il soit 
prouvé que les principes que l’on veut considérer comme des usages sont 
appliqués par les entreprises de la branche en question même dans l’absence 
d’une prévision expresse dans le contrat.   
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V.  UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES DO NOT CLASH WITH STATE CONTROL 
MECHANISMS 
 The last (but not at all the least) question raised by 
transnational rules like the UNIDROIT Principles and lex mercatoria 
are their possible interaction or conflict with control mechanisms. On 
this issue there are many important scholarly writings on lex 
mercatoria which may be recalled, and may it suffice to present only a 
few remarks concerning mandatory rules and public policy.96 
 First of all, the UNIDROIT Principles are not intended to be 
applied against mandatory rules. Article 1.4 of the UNIDROIT 
Principles states that: “[n]othing in these Principles shall restrict the 
application of mandatory rules, whether of national, international, or 
supranational origin, which are applicable in accordance with the 
relevant rules of private international law.”97 
________________________________________________________________ 
 96. See generally Norbert Horn, Codes of Conduct for MNEs and Transnational 
Lex Mercatoria: An International Process of Learning and Law Making, in LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 45-81 (1980); 
Hubert Moitry, Arbitrage international et droit de la concurrence: vers un ordre public 
de la lex mercatoria?, 1989 REV. ARB. 3 (1989); FILALI OSMAN, LES PRINCIPES 
GÉNÉRAUX DE LA LEX MERCATORIA 381 (1992); William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in 
the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 
109 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 2d ed. 1998) (observing that “[t]he healthy elaboration 
of transnational economic norms requires judicial control mechanisms to insure that 
arbitral awards purporting to be based on lex mercatoria represent more than the 
arbitrator’s personal notions of justice”); Fabrizio Marrella, Arbitrato e strumenti di 
lotta alla criminalità transnazionale riconducibili all’autonormazione ed alla lex 
mercatoria, in LA SFIDA ALL’ECONOMIA CRIMINALE NELL’ESPERIENZA GIURIDICA ITALIANA 
41-100 (2002) (discussing forms of limitation of party autonomy coming from self 
limitation of the international business community).  
97. UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 2, art. 1.4: 
 1. Mandatory rules prevail. Given the particular nature of the Principles, 
they cannot be expected to prevail over applicable mandatory rules, whether of 
national, international or supranational origin. In other words, mandatory 
provisions, whether enacted by States autonomously or to implement 
international conventions, or adopted by supranational organisations, cannot 
be overruled by the Principle.   
 2. Mandatory rules applicable in the event of mere incorporation of the 
Principles in the contract. In cases where the parties’ reference to the 
Principles is considered to be only an agreement to incorporate them in the 
contract, the Principles will first of all encounter the limit of the mandatory 
rules of the law governing the contract, i.e. they will bind the parties only to the 
extent that they do not affect the rules of the applicable law from which parties 
may not contractually derogate. In addition, the mandatory rules of the forum, 
and possibly also those of third States, will likewise prevail, provided that they 
claim application whatever the law governing the contract and, in the case of 
the rules of third States, there is a close connection between those States and 
the contract in question.  
 3. Mandatory rules applicable if the Principles are the law governing the 
contract. Yet, even where, as may be the case if the dispute is brought before an 
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 Second, there is a certain uniformity of views (at least in 
continental Europe) that mandatory rules (lois de police in French 
literature, norme di applicazione necessaria in Italian writings; 
international zwingende Rechtssätze or Zweckgesetze in German 
works) are intended to protect essential interests touching the 
political, economic, and social organization of the forum law.98 Thus, 
                                                                                                                      
arbitral tribunal, the Principles are applied as the law governing the contract, 
they cannot prejudice the application of those mandatory rules which claim 
application irrespective of which law is applicable to the contract (lois 
d’application nécessaire). Examples of such mandatory rules, the application of 
which cannot be excluded simply by choosing another law, are to be found in 
the field of foreign exchange regulations (see Articles of the Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, (Bretton Woods Agreement)), import-export 
licences (see Articles of these Principles on public permission requirements), 
regulations pertaining to restrictive trade practices, etc.  
 4. Recourse to the rules of private international law relevant in each 
individual case. Both courts and arbitral tribunals differ considerably in the 
way in which they determine the mandatory rules applicable to international 
commercial contracts. For this reason the present article deliberately refrains 
from entering into the merit of the various questions involved, in particular 
whether in addition to the mandatory rules of the forum and of the lex 
contractus those of third States are also to be taken into account and if so, to 
what extent and on the basis of which criteria. These questions are to be settled 
in accordance with the rules of private international law which are relevant in 
each particular case.  
See, e.g., 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, art. 
7, discussed supra note 38. 
 98. Cf. Law 31, art. 17, May 1995, n.218. According to the famous definition 
offered by Philippe Francescakis mandatory rules are those “lois dont l’observations est 
nécessaire pour la sauvegarde de l’organisation politique, sociale et économique du 
pays.” Philippe Francescakis, Quelques précisions sur les lois d’application immédiate 
et leurs rapport avec les règles de conflit des lois, 55 REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIV. 1 (1966); 
See generally R. AGO, LEZIONI DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 303 (1939); ERNST 
RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 558 (1945); Karl H. Neumayer, 
Autonomie de la volonté et dispositions impératives en droit international privé des 
obligations, 46 REV. CRIT. DR. INT’L PRIV. 579 (1957); T. Ballarino, Norme di 
applicazione necessaria e forma degli atti, R.D.I.P.P. 707 (1967); DE NOVA, I CONFLITTI 
DI LEGGI E LE NORME SOSTANZIALI FUNZIONALMENTE LIMITATE 699 (1967); G. SPERDUTI, 
NORME DI APPLICAZIONE NECESSARIA E ORDINE PUBBLICO 473 (1976); P. Mengozzi, 
Norme di applicazione necessaria e progetto di Convenzione CEE sulla legge applicabile 
alle obbligazioni contrattuali (la Conflict of Laws Revolution attraversa l’oceano), in 
ARCH. GIUR. SERAFINI 3 (1979); G. Pau, Le norme imperative nella Convenzione CEE 
sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali, RIV. DIR. INT. 868 (1982); T. 
Treves, Norme imperative e di applicazione necessaria nella convenzione di Roma del 
19 giugno 1980, R.D.I.P.P. 25 (1983); P. Mengozzi, La convenzione Cee sulla legge 
applicabile alle obbligazioni contrattuali, il notaio e le norme di applicazione 
necessaria, RIV. TRIM. DIR. PROC. CIV. 165 (1984); G. Cassoni, Spunti in tema di norme 
di applicazione necessaria, ARCH. G. 354 (1986); F. Mosconi, Exceptions to the 
Operation of Choice of Law Rules, 217 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 9-214 (1989); A. Bucher, L’ordre 
public et le but social des lois en droit international privé, R.C.A.D.I. 9, 9-116 (1993); H. 
BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, TRAITÉ DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 425 (1993); A. 
Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness, 245 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 
9-320 (1994); M. Frigo, La determinazione della legge applicabile in mancanza di scelta 
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mandatory rules operate unilaterally imposing substantive rules and 
neutralizing the effects of conflict of laws rules.99  
 Third, if one tries to find examples of mandatory provisions of 
national arbitration law, one will arrive at different lists according to 
the countries examined, since that characterization depends on the 
national legislature and the interpretation of national law by the 
national courts. One may say generally that certain fundamental 
principles of justice and of arbitration procedure appear to be 
mandatory in all national laws. 
 Finally, arbitral case law evidences a growing consideration of 
such rules as it is shown, inter alia, in Award Numbers 4237, 5314, 
6500, 6320, and 9333.100 In Award Number 4237, deciding a dispute 
between Syrian and Ghanian parties, the sole arbitrator, Loek 
Malberg, after having excluded application of lex mercatoria in favour 
of the application of English Law, pointed out that: “ [i]t goes without 
saying that the Arbitrator shall have regard to these bases to the 
extent that they do not deviate from the mandatory rules of the 
                                                                                                                      
dei contraenti e le norme imperative della Convenzione di Roma, in LA CONVENZIONE DI 
ROMA SUL DIRITTO APPLICABILE AI CONTRATTI INTERNAZIONALI 21 (2nd ed. 1994); T. 
Treves, Art.17 (Norme di applicazione necessaria), R.D.I.P.D. 1 (1995); N. BOSCHIERO, 
Art.14-17, in BARIATTI (1995); Legge 31 maggio 1995, N.L.C.C. 1035, 1035 n.218 (1996); 
T. Hartley, Mandatory Rules in International Contracts: The Common Law Approach, 
266 R.C.A.D.I. 337, 337-426 (1997); SERGIO M. CARBONE & R. LUZZATTO, IL CONTRATTO 
INTERNAZIONALE 103 (3d ed. 1998); T. Ballarino, Diritto internazionale privato, supra 
at 187 (observing that the common feature of these rules is “volere essere applicate 
anche quando il rapporto giuridico sul quale incidono è sottoposto ad un ordinamento 
straniero, in deroga a quanto previsto dalle norme di conflitto bilaterali”); BERNARD 
AUDIT, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 97 (1997); A. BONOMI, LE NORME IMPERATIVE NEL 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 1 (1998); L. Migliorino, Norme di applicazione 
necessaria del foro e convenzioni di diritto internazionale privato, in STUDIUM IURIS 109 
(1998); Piere Mayer, Lois de police, RÉP. DR. INT. 3 (1998); YVON LOUSSOUARN & PIERRE 
BOUREL, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 128 (1999); F. TROMBETTA PANIGADI, LE NORME 
DI APPLICAZIONE NECESSARIA NEL NUOVO SISTEMA ITALIANO DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 
PRIVATO 750 (1999); Yvon Loussouarn & Pierre Bourel, Legge regolatrice del contratto e 
rilevanza di norme di altri ordinamenti: ordine pubblico e norme di applicazione 
necessaria, in IL DIRITTO PRIVATO NELLA GIURISPRUDENZA 240-49 (2000); F. MOSCONI, 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO 174, 244 (2d ed. 2001)  
 99. “On parle de lois de police pour désigner le mécanisme d’application d’une 
règle interne à une situation internationale en fonction de sa volonté d’application et 
indipéndamment de sa désignation par une règle de conflit.” BERNARD AUDIT, DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PRIVÉ 97 (1997). 
 100. See ICC Award No. 8938 (1996): 
In virtue of the independent rule of international arbitration law, embodied in 
Art. 8(4) of the [ICC, n.d.r.] Rules, the arbitral clause is autonomous and 
juridically independent from the main contract in which it is contained either 
directly or by reference, and its existence and validity are to be ascertained, 
taking into account the mandatory rules of national law and international 
public policy, in the light of the common intention of the parties, without 
necessarily referring to a state law. 
24 Y.B. COM. ARB. 174-81 (1999). 
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applicable law.” Thus, for Malberg, it is clear that the interference of 
mandatory rules is limited to those rules pertaining to the same lex 
contractus, avoiding any other consideration on mandatory rules from 
the lex situs arbitri or the lex loci executionis. 
 ICC Award Number 5314, on the other hand, shows that even 
though the applicable law to substance of the dispute is the lex 
mercatoria (and thus a fortiori, the UNIDROIT Principles) the 
interference of mandatory rules remains unchanged.101 A line of cases 
which is followed by ICC Award Number 6500 where arbitrators 
decide that “even when lex mercatoria is applicable as any proper law 
of the contract—the court or the arbitrator—should take into account 
mandatory rules and public policy of another legal system if there are 
good and just reasons to do so (see Article 7 of the Rome Convention 
on the applicable law to contractual obligations).”102 
________________________________________________________________ 
 101. ICC Award No. 5314, 13 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 35-40 (1988). According to the 
arbitrators:   
Whereas under Swiss Rules of Conflict, the Tribunal fédéral, although the 
question is a controversial one, has applied to a licence Agreement the law of 
the domicile of the licensor, as this party is considered to perform the 
characteristic obligation (ATF 101 II 293). Whereas this solution has also been 
adopted by the new Federal law on private international law (Art. 122(1)) . . . 
Whereas however, such solution has been criticized, in particular on the basis 
that the law of the domicile of the licensee may contain mandatory rules which 
in any case, have to be observed. 
 102. See excerpts in 119 J. DU DROIT INT’L (1992) (citing Arnaldez, Recueil, III 
CCI), at 452-54. 
[L]orsque la est applicable comme toute autre “proper law” du contrat—le juge 
ou l’arbitre—devrait tenir compte d’une norme d’application immédiate où 
d’ordre public appartenant à un autre système loefrsqu’il y a de bonnes et 
justes raisons de le faire (V.art. 7 de la Convention de Rome entre les Etats 
membres de la CEE sur la loi applicable aux obligations contractuelles). C’est 
précisément le cas dans ce litige. Dans la mesure où la loi libanaise est 
impérative et a pour but de protéger le représentant, cette loi est d’ordre public. 
De ce fait, même si le tribunal décidait d’appliquer la lex mercatoria, il ne 
devrait pas ignorer de telles dispositions. Enfin, même si la loi libanaise est 
applicable, la lex mercatoria peut encore être utilisée dans l’application de la loi 
libanaise, ou dans la mesure où la loi libanaise est silencieuse. 
For a decision in which RICO was considered mandatory law excluding sanctions of 
treble damages, see ICC Award No. 6320 (1992), 20 Y.B. COM. ARB. 62-109 (1995).  
Arbitrators have observed:  
 While the United States is certainly free to mandate application of its law to 
its nationals and to others within its jurisdiction, the Tribunal cannot find that 
such a mandatory application is in this Case warranted with regard to a 
foreign national outside the United States’ jurisdiction. The fact that the 
foreign national itself ‘seeks’ the protection of RICO cannot affect the above 
finding, since it seeks a ‘mandatory’ protection that would be contrary to the 
choice of law it agreed to with the other party. 
 The conclusion might be different if the national mandatory law would have 
to be considered as reflecting a principle of international public policy. 
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 Finally, ICC Award Number 9333 confirms further that the 
question of applicability of mandatory rules to international 
arbitration does not really change according to the national or 
anational nature of the applicable law. On the public policy exception 
as a form of control device the same conclusions apply. Respect of 
public policy of the lex situs arbitri and/or (after Hilmarton and 
Chromalloy cases) of the lex loci executionis is imposed by domestic 
courts regardless of the specific national or anational origin of the 
rules applied by arbitrators. What counts at exequatur stage is only 
the legal result of the arbitral decision and not the rules of law 
employed to reach it.  
 This insight finds confirmation in Ministry of Defense and 
Support for the Armed Forces of The Islamic Republic of Iran v. Cubic 
Defense Systems, Inc.:  
 Cubic also disputes the Tribunal’s reference to the Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts published in 1994 by the 
UNIDROIT Institute (UNIDROIT Principles) and the Tribunal’s 
references to principles of fairness such as good faith and fair dealing. 
Cubic claims that references to such international and equitable 
principles also violates Art. V(1)(c) because this law exceeds the scope of 
the Terms of Reference. The reference to the UNIDROIT Principles 
does not exceed the scope of the Terms of Reference. One of the issues 
presented to the Tribunal was whether general principles of 
international law apply to this dispute. That Cubic disagrees with the 
Tribunal’s response to the question posed by the parties is not a reason 
to find that the Tribunal addressed issues beyond the scope of the 
Terms of Reference. The same is true for Cubic’s assertions with regard 
to the Tribunal’s references to equitable principles of contract law.103 
                                                                                                                      
However, such a qualification cannot be made for the treble damages rule of 
the RICO statute, whose application is at stake here. In fact, as mentioned 
above, this rule is specific to the United States and is not found either in other 
major national legal systems or in international conventions. While it is, of 
course, in the interest of the international community and international 
commerce to prevent, also at the international level, practices such as those at 
which RICO aims, it cannot be judged that the specific legal consequences of a 
treble damages claim of an ‘injured’ party, which is the only issue at stake in 
this arbitration, are a common feature of many national laws or of 
international law. The Tribunal, therefore, concludes that the application of 
RICO is not mandatory in the present Case. 
 Even if, as found above, the application of RICO is not mandatory in the 
present Case, at least in theory that would not exclude that the treble damages 
provision of RICO is applicable due to a choice expressed by the parties in the 
Contract. For the sake of completeness, and as the parties have addressed that 
issue in detail, the Tribunal therefore hereafter will examine that issue as well. 
However, as will be seen, the Tribunal finds that RICO is also not applicable on 
this basis of the Contract. 
Id. See also discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing Rome 
Convention). 
 103. Ministry of Defense & Support for the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran v. Cubic Defense Systems, Inc., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1173 (S.D. Cal. 1998). 
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Hence, the court, joining the streamline of lex mercatoria decisions of 
European courts, has stated that: 
[T]his court’s discretion in reviewing a foreign arbitration award is 
quite circumscribed. See Ministry of Defense, 969 F.2d at 770. The 
Tribunal’s reference to and application of the UNIDROIT Principles 
and principles such as good faith and fair dealing do not violate Art. 
V(1)(c). The Tribunal applied these principles to differences 
contemplated by and falling within the terms of the submission to 
arbitration and therefore the Award does not violate Art. V(1)(c).104 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, there is little doubt that third-millennium 
international arbitrators will face the flowering of a transnational 
rule such as the UNIDROIT Principles for international commercial 
contracts. They will be used to solve problems of characterization, 
preliminary questions, and choice of law to the merits of the dispute. 
In this sense, it appears clearly that these rules are to be construed 
under a triangular scheme. Thus, lex mercatoria and transnational 
rules like the UNIDROIT Principles will intervene more and more in 
the arbitral choice-of-law process in three competing contexts: (1) as a 
lex contractus; (2) as a means to interpret, supplement, or adapt 
national law; and (3) as a means to resolve matters of interpretation 
or gap-filling in international conventions. Criticism by conservative 
private international law scholars towards the choice of lex 
mercatoria and transnational rules seems therefore to have been 
overcome by arbitral practice. 
 The second group of cases has shown that the antagonism 
between lex mercatoria or transnational rules and domestic law is 
less a matter of conflicting rules and more a problem of 
harmonization of principles. Thus, the transnational test (I have 
called it the TNT test) becomes a technique of adaptation of domestic 
law in a transnational arbitration context. In this way it becomes 
evident that many rules drawn from domestic legal systems come in 
line with needs of international trade. Criticism by the lex mercatoria 
orthodoxy on the parochialism offered by the application of state 
conflict-of-law rules may, thus, be overcome.  
 Finally, awards excluding the application of the UNIDROIT 
Principles show the progressive sophistication of international trade 
law rules: a differentiation, within lex mercatoria, between generally 
accepted principles of contract law and international trade usages 
seems to be ongoing. New challenges shall be faced.  Paradoxically, 
the need for progressive codification of transnational law is leading 
________________________________________________________________ 
 104. Id. 
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the world community to a sort of non-binding over-codification of this 
branch of law.   
 There are numerous commissions in charge of codification of 
international contract law in many parts of the world, the most 
famous being the Lando Commission whose aim is to design the 
future European Civil Code. Many sets of principles presently claim 
to be applied whenever lex mercatoria is at stake.105  Yet in most post-
UNIDROIT sets of principles there is no reference to rules on conflict 
of principles. The danger of over-codification becomes reality when we 
consider the case of an arbitrator having to apply lex mercatoria or 
transnational rules and facing two or more collections of nonbinding 
principles all of which are self-declared codifications of the new law 
merchant (i.e. the UNIDROIT and the European Contract Law 
Principles).  Which set shall prevail and why? 
 One global set of principles like the UNIDROIT Principles 
should prevail.  This would allow the rules of transnational commerce 
to be more consistent and predictable in the third millennium.  If this 
does not happen, we will have substituted the complexity of 
conflicting sets of principles for “classical problems” of conflict of laws. 
 Five centuries after it was made, Lanfranco da Oriano’s prophecy 
might still govern international arbitration from his grave, leaving a 
great sense of anxiety for legal scholars willing to explain the 
mysteries of transnational trade. The purpose of the present 
symposium is to shed some light in the darkness of legal prejudice 
and academic conservatism. I hope with the present paper to have 
provided some comfort to the curious reader. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 105. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW: PART I & II 95 (Ole Lando & 
Hugh Beale eds., 1998). 
Art. 1:101:  Application of the Principles: (1) These Principles are intended to be 
applied as general rules of contract law in the European Communities. 
(2) These Principles will apply when the parties have agreed to incorporate 
them into their contract or that their contract is to be governed by them. 
(3) These Principles may be applied when the parties: (a) have agreed that 
their contract is to be governed by “general principles of law,” the “lex 
mercatoria” or the like; or (b) have not chosen any system or rules of law to 
govern their contract. 
(4) These Principles may provide a solution to the issue raised where the 
system or rules of law applicable do not do so. 
Id. 
